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Control, in the management sense, is as old as organization itself
—
and organization is said to have started when the world's population grew
from one to two. Aristotle hss stated in his discourse Politics ; rtHe who
is unable to live in society or who has no need because he is sufficient
for himself, must either be a beast or a god . . . ,' ! As Aristotle implies,
it is difficult, if not impossible to exist outside of social relationsh-
Human association satisfies man's social needs and, in addition, amplifies
burean capacities through cooperative effort, "what one man cannot do, two
can do; what one can do, two can do better. !,x Cooperative effort, however,
involves some form of work division and whenever the tasks are divided,
some means is necessary to assure performance in a manner that will achieve
the common goal which is the basis for cooperation. This is the function
of control. Control may be informal and a relatively simple matter, as
in the case of two men moving a heavy stone or it may be a formal and co -
plex system as is found in siodern industrial enterprise. As organizations
change, so raist control within the organization:
In the formative days of modern business enterprise management
control presented little problem. Typically, the entrepreneur
initiated his own plans, and made modifications when necessary, The
poals of the firm were identically the £oals of the proprietor. The
X:?enry H. Albers, Crpini?ed : xecutive Action: Decision-making ,
Ce-rgTunication, and leadership (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961),
p. ?.

recorded information needed by the top executive to run the business
was minimal.
1
As companies grew, control became more necessary for effective
management. The efforts of many individuals required cooroination and
the plans of the top executives had to be executed through an extensive
hierarchy of Managers, supervisors, foremen and workers. An accurate
"feedback" of information was required to determine if plans were being
followed or should be modified.
Control is an essential attribute of effective management. Yet
the word "control ,: often evokes unpleasant images in men's minds. It has
been said:
Our whole concept of control is "najve," "primitive" and ridden
with an almost retributive idea of causality. Control to aost people
(and what a reflection this is upon a sophisticated society I } is a
crude process of coercion. A traffic policeman, for example, is al-
leged to be in "control." He is in fact, trying to determine a
critics! decisionmaking point on much too little information by a
fundamentally bullying approach (because it is backed by legal sanc-
tions 5.3
The problem as Rathe observes it, is that "'control' has just too
many and too different meanings.** Outside the business world the terms
^Charles P. Bonini, rlobert K. Jaedicke, Harvey .":. v.a^ner (eds.)
?
! an&A'ement Controls; ^ow riractions in Basic :'issearch
,
(New York: KcGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1964}, p. ix.
2
Ibid.
•^Stafford Beer, Cybernetics and Management (New York: John I iiey
-ins, Inc., 1959), p. ?1.
**Alex W. Rathe, "Management Control in Business," eds. Donald G.
Malcolm and Alan J. rtowe, ?-;ana percent Control bystems (Sfaw York: John Wiley
ons, Inc., 196C), p. 32.
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"currency control," "pest control," "rent control" and "birth control"
are frequently used. It is also aaid a politician "controls" votea and
thereby exerts influence; & person "controls' his temper and thus suppresses
something; a "control" valve regulates something; a football team wins
through ball "control" or, therefore, by possessing something.
Control, in the management sense is also a term seeking definition.









The coriaon element in ail of these terms is the word "control,"
yet each one is conceptually and operationally different.
Tiie problem of the diversity of meanings of control has plagued
writers and commentators in the field of management since the word
first came to be associ&tec with the administrative task. Management
has been described as consisting of two elements
—
planning and control-
ling—or as many as forty-seven with control being prominent in most ail
interpretations of management. A number of descriptions of control, by
various writers, appear in this paper. Common to most of these are the
irii

following essential steps: (I) Betting of goals and standards of perform-
ance, (2) gathering data and checking results to see how performance coo-
pares with the standards, and (3) initiating corrective action where
actual results do not meet the standards.
This paper is concerned, principally, with "m&nagenent control,"
a refinement in the description of the control function in organizations
which has recently gained renewed interest. The term "management control"
is en attempt to distinguish between the process of keeping day-to-day,
functionally oriented operations, in conformance with plans (operational
control), and the process of integrating the various operations into a
corraon effort to achieve over-ail objectives—which is the essence of
managernt control.
A standardized definition of control, as it applies to the cooper-
ative effort of individuals within organizations, may well develop quite
independent of the less restricted use of the word. There has recently
been developed in the field of science, however, a concept of control which
emphasizes the similarities in control as it exists in the nervous systems
of higher animals, sleetrc-mechanical devices, and in social, political
and economic organizations. The implications of this concept are far-
reaching. To the extent that decision rules can be formalized and ex-
pressed quantitatively, automatic control of administrative processes with-
in organizations is considered to be feasible. Seme people, however,
particularly those associated with traditional management thought, doubt
that appreciable inroads in the area of automating management control
viii

are possible or that Information-Feedback Control Theory or Cybernetics
adequately describes the management process.
This paper is addressed to the question of whether the evoivement
of Information-Feedback. Control Theory, and its application to management,
has modified or invalidated the basic concepts of the control function
in management . The research method utilised in its preparation has been
a review of the rapidly expanding collection of management literature
dealing with the subject of control. This study, therefore, relies
heavily upon the opinions of individuals knowledgeable in this field
who have presented their views and experiences before academic seminars,
professional societies and, through books and periodicals, before the
general public. This research ha© led to the conclusion that management
science, which is the application of the concepts and methods of physical
science to the study of organisations, provides a useful means for viewing
the management process and valid methods for testing and applying its
postulations to the solution of management control problems. Management
science, however, has not altered the basic concepts of what the control
function in management is and how it is accomplished. Traditional manage-
ment thought, although exhibiting considerable disarray, has be^n found
to still provide a useful body of knowledge which, when combined with
the contributions of those schooled in the physical sciences, can contrib-




The format to be followed in the presentation of the researcn and
findings of this study is as follows:
Chapter I presents the concept of control developed by Henri Fayol,
the first writer to specifically identify control as an element of manage-
ment, and discusses the effect of Fayol' s work on subsequent management
thought
.
More recent views of management control are included in Chapter II
within a general framework of: (a) The Principles of Control, (b) The
Active "leraent in Control, and (c) The Informational Aspects of Control.
Although the writings presented comprise only a small portion of the
extensive literature on the subject, they have been selected as repre-
sentative of current management thought.
Chapter Til discusses the origins and contributions of management
science with specific attention to Information-Feedback Control Theory and
to the holistic or systems approach to management.
In Chapter IV, some of the more important considerations which
must underlie the design of management information and control systems
are discussed. The contributions of both management art and management
science are presented in relation to essential considerations in systems
design to emphasize the significance and limitations of both. A brief
discussion concerning development of a unified theory of management control
is also included.
A summary of the research ana the conclusions reached appears in
Chapter V.

The terms "traditionalist" and "samgessent scientist" are used in
this paper to identify scholars, academicians and practitionners associated
with contemporary management thought. The forser refers to those who
have generalised on the management process fro© observation and experi-
ence, the latter those who have conceptualised from analogy and from
experimentation. Although both terras can b® found in the literature of
management, neither are entirely satisfactory discriptions. One imolies
looking backward, the other looking forward, a distinction that is not
intended. The &«¥&• art used in this paper only as a convenience for ex-
pressing the different frames of reference based on the backgrounds and
specific interests of the individuals thus categorized.
I wish to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to those
who have made this research project possible—to the officers of the United
States Navy for allowing me to pursue my graduate studies, to The George
Washington university and its faculty meisbers for extending the opportunity
to participate in the Master^ degree program. Specific gratitude is
expressed to those who assisted in this effort—to Dr. James G. Brown
who provided the initial impetus to this study, to Dr. Karl ?,. Stromsem
for advising at in the research of this paper and. for the helpful sugges-
tions he offered. Sincere and affectionate appreciation is also given to
E*y wife Pat for her patience and encouragement and to our three children
who exhibited less patience but, nevertheless often expressed empathic




TOE FAYOLIAN CONCEPT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL
Henri Fayol, considered by many to be the father of modern manage-
ment thought, was born in France in 1841.* At the age of 19 he graduated
as a raining engineer from the National School of Mines at St. Etienne and
was placed as an engineer at the Commentry coal mines of the Comraentry-
Fourchambault Company (Comambault) in I860, He remained with this organ-
isation throughout his business career, retiring as the Managing Director
in 1918, but continuing as a director of the company until his death in
1925 at the age of &U.
At the time of his appointment to the chief executive position
in 1888, the company was close to bankruptcy. No dividends had been paid
for several years; its metallurgical works were sustaining heavy losses
and its major coal field was nearing depletion. Fayol, by his practical
as well as scientific skill, was able to not only stem the tide of losses
but to expand the company, while building a strong financial base and a
continuous record of dividends and profits.
Speaking of Fayol' s business career, Urwick points out: "The
success with which he carried out . . . [his duties as Managing Director
^The biographical material on Henri Fayol which appears in this
chapter is from L. Urwick' s Foreword to Henri Fayol »s General and Indus-
trial Management (Storrs translation) published by Sir Isaac Pitman &
Sons, Ltd. in 1949.

of Comarabault} is one of the romances of French industrial history."1
After his retirement from active management, Fayol devoted his
efforts to publicising the theory of management which he developed from
both his personal observation and long experience. Although trained as
an engineer, Fayol realized early in his career that management of a
large industrial organization required additional skills far different
from those essential in engineering. A manager, he observed, must be
able to formulate plans and to organize the efforts of many people to
achieve these plans. This was a function far different from the science
of engineering and led to his identification of the administrative func-
tion as distinct from the technical function in business organizations.
Fayol' s best known treatise on the subject of management was
first published in France in 1916 under the title Administration indus-
trielle et generale . It was reprinted in French several times, but an
English translation was not available until 1929 when J. A. Coubrough
of The British Xylonite Company, Ltd., completed a translation of the
work which he had undertaken voluntarily. This translation was published
by the International Institute of Management at Geneva; however, few
copies were available either in England or the United States. Even as
late as 1945 most libraries in the United States, including The Library
of Congress, did not have copies of Fayol* s book, either in French or
English. A more widely distributed English translation by Miss Constance
Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Management . Trans, by
Constance Storrs. (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1949 )» p. vii,
2Norman M. Pearson, "Fayolism as the Necessary Complement of
Taylorism," American Political Science Review . February 1945, p. 80.

3Storrs, however, appeared in 19A9 under the title General and Industrial
Management .
Until publication of the Storrs translation few practitioners or
students of management either in England or the United States were familiar
with Fayol's work, although one of his papers, "Hie Administrative Theory
of the State," was translated by Miss Sarah Qreer and included in a col-
lection edited by Luther Gulick and lyndall Urwick which was published
in 1937.X
Fayol's work, although not widely known to the English speaking
world until nearly a quarter century following his death, has had a pro-
found impact on the study of management both in this country and in the
British Isles. Fayol maintained that management should be a part of
the curriculum of institutions of higher learning. He decried the lack
of management teaching in the technical schools of his time, insisting
that managerial ability should be acquired in the same manner as techni-
cal ability—initially in the schools and later in the workplace. His
book represented an attempt to develop a universal theory of management,
applicable both in government and private business which could be a basis
for teaching this most important subject.*
Fayol's Elements of Management, and to some extent his Management
Principles, have been incorporated in many of the recent texts describing
~L. Oulick and L. Urwick (eds) Papers on the Science of Adminis-
tration (New York: Institute of Public"7dministraticn, 1937).
*Fayol, op. cit ., Part I, "Necessity and Possibility of Teaching
Management ."

the practices or processes of management."- Professor Koontz, in a tribute
to Fayol, states
i
... a study of Fayol' s monograph, with its practical and
clear approach to the job of the manager and his perception
of the universality of management principles, discloses an
extraordinary insight into the problems which beset business
management today. Indeed, even though the thinking of certain
students of management was clearly affected by Fayol long
before his work was brought to the attention of the general
public, one regrets that all serious students of business
management did not have the advantage of Fayol* s analysis.
Fayol' s contribution to management theory is from the viewpoint
of top management and throughout his work is found a central theme which
(1) emphasises the distinction between the management function and the
other activities which occur in public and private enterprises, and (2)
indicates the direct relationship between the amount of time an individual
devotes to the management function, in comparison with the other activi-
ties, especially the technical function, and his position in the "scaler
chain" of the organization. Fayol conceived management to be but one of
the six functions occurring in most enterprises. These functions—techni-
cal, commercial, financial, security, accounting and management—in total
comprise the "government of the enterprise." He perceived the management
function as distinct from the other five essential functions and cautioned
the reader: ttIt should not be confused with government."
*For example, see Harold Koonts and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles
of Kanagement: An Analysis of Managerial Functions (New York: McGraw-
Hlll Book Company, 1955), and William H. Newman and Charles 2. Summer,
Jr., The Process of Management: Concepts. Behavior, and Practice (Engle-
wood Cliffs, K. J.: Prentice-Kail, Inc., 1961).
Ttoontz and O'Donnell, op. cit .. pp. 22-23.

"To govern is to conduct the undertaking towards its objective by
seeking to derive optimum advantage from all available resources and to
assure the smooth working of the six essential functions. "^
Although management is only one of the six functions of government
of the enterprise, as Fayol indicates, it has "such a large place in the
part played by higher management that sometimes this part seems exclusively
managerial. M* Fayol speculated that the heads of large industrial concerns
and government departments spend half or more of their time on managerial
activities and devote no more than ten per cent of their time on each of
the remaining five functions.-*
As indicated previously, Fayol* s elements of management have been
used in essentially the same form by recent writers to describe the man-
agement function of executives. Fayol incorporates these elenients in a
definition of management in which he states:
To manage is to forecast and to plan, to organize, to command,
to co-ordinate and to control. To foresee and provide the means
for examining the future and drawing up the plan of action. To
organize means building up the dual structure, material and human,
'•Fayol, op. cit . t p. 6. The earlier Coubrough translation employed
different terminology than the subsequent Storrs edition. Coubrough used
the word "management" in lieu of "government" to describe the total workings
of the six functions. Additionally, Coubrough translated the sixth function
as "administration" directly from the French word, whereas Storrs used the
term "management." Urwick, in his foreword to the Storrs translation,
points out that there is no exact equivalent to the word "management" in
the French language. He states that Miss Storrs and her publishers decided
on the substitution of management for administration because of the tendency,
particularly in his country, to attempt to distinguish between management,
as an activity of industrial or commercial enterprises, and administration,
concerned with governmental activities. Fayol, op. cit .. pp. xil-xv.
Ibid., p. 6.
3 Ibid ., p. 8.

6of the undertaking. To command weans maintaining activity among the
personnel. To co-ordinate means binding together, unifying and har-
monizing all activity and effort. To control means seeing that
everything occurs in conformity with established rule and expressed
command.
The object of control, again in Fayol's own words,
... is to point out weaknesses and errors in order to rectify them
and prevent recurrence. It operates on everything, things, people,
actions. From the B&n&gws&ent standpoint it must be ensured that a
plan does exist, that it is put into operation and kept up-to-date,
that the human organization is complete, the summarized personnel
charts in use, and that command is exercised in line with principles,
that co-ordinating conferences are held, etc., etc.,
. .
.*
He also relates control to the other functions within the organ-
ization. Control from, a technical standpoint, for example, would include
the reporting and evaluation of production progres*. Control, as it occurs
in conjunction with the internal supervision of the various functional de-
partments, is a responsibility of the head of those department a and as such
is not a direct concern of higher management. Management control as viewed
by Fayol is concerned only with those matters which significantly affect
interrelationships of the various functional areas and the smooth opera-
tions of the concern as a whole. It is in this connection that he stresses
the potential danger of an infiltration of management control into the op-
eration of the various departments. If allowed to occur this encroachment
results in a form of dual management— "on the one side there is irresponsi-
ble control
. . . capable at times of doing widespread harm; on the other





To prevent the intrusion of management control into operations,
Fayol states that the "powers of control" should be clearly defined at the
outset including the limits of authority of those executives concerned
with the exercise of control and that control procedures must also be con-
tinuously monitored by higher authority.*
Fayol concluded his remarks on the subject of control with the ob-
servation that, when properly implemented, control can be an important
adjunct to management and can assure the receipt of necessary data which
Might not otherwise be forwarded by those in subordinate supervisory
positions.-'
One of the earliest acceptances of Henri Fayol 1 s concepts of
inegeatnt is found in lyndall Urwick's The i* laments of Administration
published in 1943. Utilizing a fraraework of Fayol' s elements and prin-
ciples of management and list of "managerial duties," Urwick brought to-
gether various management theories, principally those contained in the





*I . Urwick, The Elements of Administration (fiew York: Harper I
Brothers, 19^3).

aParker Follett, in addition to Fayol. With block diagrams showing a logi-
cal flow from one principle to another and a tabular summary of the various
elements, principles and duties, Urwick attempted to demonstrate an in-
herent unity among the various theories of management.2 He undertook to
corrJbine principles of management, the processes employed for their achieve-
ment, and the effects of these processes into the "logical scheme" which
Mooney and Riley adapted from the writings of Louis Anderson.
First, that every principle has its process and effect, and
second, that if these have been correctly identified, the
process and effect will, in their turn, be found to have,
each of them, a principle, process and effect.-*
Following this pattern, Urwick expands Fayol* s element of Plan-
ning to include both forecasting anu planning (as did Storrs), and adds
"Appropriateness," the second of Fayol' s Administrative duties. At this
point he states:
Thus the logical square is completed with the exception of the
principle underlying the whole process of Administration hanage-
rsent . And here it is not unduly straining probability to imagine
that Fayol himself would have inserted Investigation .**
*F. V. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1911); F. W. Taylor, "Shop Management," Transactions of
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, June 1903, pp. 13^7-1480;
J. D. Mooney and A. C. Riley, Onward Industry! (New York: Harper &
3rothers, Fubiishers, 1931); and Henry C. Metcalf and L. Urwick, Dynamic
Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Pollett (New York:
Harper & Brothers, Publishers, n.c).
o
Urwick in his book uses the term "administration" in lieu of
"management." He regretted the substitution of the term management for
administration in the subsequently published Storrs translation of Fayol'
s
Administration industrielie et geWrale , citing the lack of a precise mean-
ing for the t^'rra management and the need to standardize terminology.
-^Mooney and Riley, op. cit
. , p. 45.
**Urwick, op. clt . t p. 17.

Urwick summarizes to this point by saying:
These three principles, each with its corresponding process
and effect, make up the perfect logical square summarising sic
the main aspects of Administration, the underlying principle on
which the whole art rests is Investigation . It enters into proc-
ess with Forecasting and the effect is a Plan or Planning . Fore-
casting has its own principle, namely Appropriateness . It
enters into process with Organization , since the first thing you
do when you look ahead is to provide the means, human and material,
to meet the future situation which you foresee. Its effect is Co-
ordination . Finally, Planning finds its principle in Order, enters
into process with Command , and the effect is Control .*"""
Urwick* s "Square of Nine" is shown in Figure 1-1, page 10. It is
perhaps unfortunate that Urwick chose this particular method of presenta-
tion. At the time of its publication, his book was regarded as strong
evidence that a science of management would ultimately be possible.*
Fayol and Taylor however viewed enterprise from the antipodean positions
of workshop and the executive suite. And Mary Parker Follett focused on
the human aspects of management. The considerable risk of attempting to
combine various theories of management developed independently by in-
dividuals of differing perspectives is obvious and nowhere is this more
evident than in Fayol* s concept of control. Throughout his book, Fayol
emphasises the reporting or intelligence gathering aspects of control
and the correction of deviations from plan rather than the exercise of
directing or restraining power which Urwick 's statement "Command takes
effect in Control" implies. It was within the latter connotation of the
1Ibid., p. 18.
Marshall E. Dimock. Review of The Elements of Administration





L. URWICX'5 TABULAR PRESENTATION OF
7NCI?Ln,S OF ADMINISTRATION*
1. PRINCIPLE 2. PROCESS 3. EFFECT
1. INVESTIGATION RE CASTING NKING
All scientific procedure Investigation enters into And takes effect in a
is based on investigation process with forecasting, plan,
of the facts, which thus
becomes the first prin-
ciple of administration.
FORECASTING
must be in terms which correspond with the realities of the situation, i.e.
with the general objectives and broad policy of the undertaking. It there-
fore finds its underlying principle in
2. APPROPRIATENESS
See that the human and
material organizations




process with the provi-
sion of a suitable organ-
ization.
CO-ORDINATION
And takes effect in co-
ordination.
PLANNING
The purpose of planning is to secure systematic action in accordance with
the general objectives and broad policy of the undertaking. It therefore finds
its underlying principle in
ORDER COMMAND
Ensure human and material Planning enters into
order. process with command.
CONTROL
And takes effect in
control.
aSource: I. Urwick, The Elements of Administration , New York: Harper
& Brothers Publishers, 1944, p. 19-
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word control that ho included Follett' s concept of control in management
with that of Fayol. The writings of Mary Parker Follett are singularly
remarkable for their emphasis on the sociological factors in contrast to
the mechanistic aspects of organisation well before wide recognition of
their applications in business organizations developed. She theorized
that industrial organizations, to be successful, "mist be constructed
and operated as to give play to the motivating desires of the individual
and of the group."1 Unfortunately Kiss Follett does not define the term
control but it would appear its meaning, as used in her writing, is sim-
ilar to that adopted by the sociologist Dowd who, in 1936, wrote: "con-
trol in any organization involves the exercise of authority, the formula-
tion of a purpose, the fixing of standards, and the enforcement of
discipline."2
A definition similar to Dowd's is implied in Miss Follett'
s
development of the thesis that effective control must be based on and
result from coordination rather than coercion. Employing the example of
self-control in hur.an physiology, she wrote:
. . . the organizing activity is the directing activity. The
interacting is the control, it does not set up a control, that
fatal expression of some writers on government ana also some
writers on business administration. I cannot get up in the
morning, I cannot walk to my work, without that co-ordination
of muscles which is control.
3
^•George Filipetti, Industrial Management in Transition (Homewood,
111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1953), p. 259.
^Jerome Dowd, Control in Human Societies (New York: D. Appleton-
Century Company, Incorporated, 1936), p. 151.
^Metcalf and Urwick, op. cit .. pp, 202-2Q3.
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That Urwick Included both Mary Parker Follett's rules for co-
ordination, Frederick W. Taylor's Exception Principle of reporting only
deviations from standard, as well as Fayol's principles and managerial
duties relating to control as an intelligence gathering element of man-
agement, is no less remarkable than the fact that he intersperses exam-
ples and comments which support the various concepts of control held by
these writers. For example, he provides a rather interesting illustra-
tion of control as practiced in the British Army to overcome a tendency
to be "lightfingered" with public funds. From the Restoration to almost
the end of the 19th century army regiments were treated as if they were
the property of the Colonel-in-Command . He received a capitation grant
by the government on the basis of personnel strength to feed and clothe
the men under his charge. Whatever remained after these necessities were
provided was available to the colonel for his own use. At one point,
Urwick points out, colonels of regiments were allowed officially to im-
prove their own lots by maintaining, a number of fictitious names of men
on the strength of which they could draw the capitation fee. This system
was open to abuse and, to eliminate its practice, a system of musters was
introduced. Visits were made to each regiment by representatives of the
government and at that time the colonels were required to parade the full
regiment so that a head count could be made for confirmation with the re-
ported strength of the unit. Urwick states: "There are many amusing
stories of hasty and temporary recruitment of the maimed, the halt and
the blind, to meet the requirements of an unexpected muster .... A
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muster was, of course, a form of control"^
Elsewhere he stater;
Indeed the conception of control as a principle and some
knowledge of its methods are probably more widespread and gen-
erally developed in human undertakings than any of the other
aspects of administration which have been discussed. . . . ad-
ministrators all down the ages have been interested in methods
of keeping themselves informed as to the results of their plans
and orders .2
If a muster is a form of control, this writer wonders what its
method would be. Again quoting Urwick:
The various aspects which Fayol has analysed, if arranged in
order of time, make the segments of a complete circle. Fore-
casting leads to planning. The next operation is organiza-
tion, which issues in co-ordination. Then comes Command and,
finally, Control, next to Forecasting again, and appropriately
next to it, since much of the material thrown up by a modern
system of control is as valuable for locking forward as for
reviewing the past. It is the factual basis of forecasting
the next period ahead.
3
Later he states:
' Indeed, additional mechanism creates further problem of
internal co-ordination, so that a large proportion of the
efforts of all concerned is devoted to keeping in step rather
than to stepping out.
These considerations led her £_Follett3 to four broad rules
or principles, which should guide the administrator in secur-
ing co-ordination, which, by definition is control,^
^Urwick, op. cit .. pp. 98-99.
2
Ibid., p. 97.




uUrwick nowhere in his book acknowledges any lack of comparabil-
ity between the various concepts of control. Parts I and II of Fayol 'a
General and Industrial Management are quite brief, totaling only one
hundred and ten pages. Part III, in which Fayol promised to cite exam-
ples of the applications of the various elements of management, was
never written. It is, therefore, possible that Urwick misconstrued
Fayol 's notion of control. Perhaps the clearest statement of Fayol'
s
concept of control was contained in his paper, "The Administrative
Theory of the State," included in a collection edited by Gulick and
Urwick. In this paper, prepared for presentation before the Second
International Congress of Administrative Science at Brussels in 1923,
he wrote:
To prepare the operations is to plan and organize; to see
that they are carried out is to command and co-ordinate; to
watch results is to control .... Control is the examina-
tion of results . . . control compares, aiscusses and crit-
icises; it tends to stimulate planning, to simplify and
strengthen organization, to increase the efficiency of com-
mand and to facilitate co-ordination.^
Confusion with respect to the exact meaning of management con-
trol continues to the present time. Captain E. S. L. Goodwin of the
University of Michigan has researched the contemporary usage in Fayol'
s
time of the French word "eontroler" which Fayol used for the sixth ele-
ment of management. He found that dominant meaning of "controler" was
Gulick and Urwick, op. cit ., p. 103.
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checking, comparing and verifying and that the idea of directing, re-
straining, using overriding power, the usual meaning of the English word
control was not applicable. Goodwin, accordingly, believes the con-
fusion about what constitutes management control is attributable in part
to a mistranslation by Coubrough and suggests that surveillance would be
a more appropriate term.
As Professor KoontE has said, Henri Fayol exhibited an "extra-
ordinary insight" into the problems of modern management. The impact of
his work, however, was dulled by an unfortunate chain of events which
included:
1. His failure to complete Part III of the book. Parts I and
II were intended to establish the necessity and possibility of manage-
ment teaching and tc provide a framework of elements, principles and
duties to be used in management instruction. An expanded discussion of
the elements, principles and duties, as well as examples of their appli-
cation, were to have been included in Part III.
2. The impreciseness of the translation from French to English
which resulted in the use of the emotionally charged word "control"
rather than one which carries the connotation of checking, verifying
or comparing and more appropriately matches the author's intended
meaning.
*8. 5. L. Goodwin, "Control: A Brief Excursion on the Meaning
of a Word;' Michigan Business Review , January I960, p. 16.
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3. The general unavareness In the English speaking countries of
Fayol's work until nearly a quarter century after his death.
L. Urwick's early attempt to bludgeon a fit of generally un-
related theories of management developed by writers whose work pro-
ceeded independently of each other, who viewed the enterprise from
greatly dispersed vantage points and focused on different aspects of
management. Nowhere is this lack of fit more in evidence than in the
case of management control.
A careful reading of either of the translations of Fayol's
Administration industrielle et gerierale will show that Fayol's concept
of control emphasized the checking-up or surveillance aspect of manage-
ment rather than a restraint or dominating component. As such, control
is unrelated either to Urwick's theory that cost-sand results in control
or Follett's concept of effecting control through co-ordination rather
than coercion. This is not to say that Fayol's and Follett's theories
of management were incompatible—both, for example, recognized the need
for co-ordination in organizations—but their views on control which were
based on entirely different meanings of the word are incompatible.
Goodv/in charges Coubrough, the first translator of Administration
industrielle et generale , with primary responsibility for the confusion
which today surrounds the word control when used in the management
sense. To a large extent Urwick must share in the blame for his book,
riercents of Administration , which preceded publication of the more widely
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distributed Storrs translation, misrepresented Fayol's concept of con-
trol, and probably preconditioned many readers to an erroneous inter-
pretation of Fayol's remarks concerning manage:nent control.
Only after reemphasia of the intelligence gathering or reporting
aspects of management control, and the corresponding deemphasis of the
emotionally inflammable, domineering aspects, did a true identification
of management control and control systems begin to emerge. In some
respects this represents a reapproachment to Fayol. In the following
chapters, these concepts of control in management will be discussed.

CHAPTER II
SUBSEQUENT VIEWS OF CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS
In the previous chapter it was developed that Fayol's sixth element
of management denoted an idea far different from the concept of control in
society and organizations which had grown up, quite independently, in the
English speaking regions. The semantics difficulties, however, have per-
sisted. In 1950 Jackson Martendell wrote:
So far ... I have not talked of "control" at all; I have
talked of "measurements." This was intentional. For "control"
is an ambiguous word. It means ability to direct oneself and
one's work. It can also mean domination of one person by
another. Objectives are the basis of ''control" in the first
sense; but they must never become the basis of "control" in the
second, for this would defeat their purpose. Indeed, one of
the major contributions of management by objectives is that it
enables us to substitute management by self-control for manage-
ment by domination.
No serious student of management, of course, has advocated manage-
ment by domination but Martendell 1 s statement illustrates the wide range of
possible interpretations of management control, covering a whole spectrum
from the broadest possible whereby, as Rathe points out, control has become
completely synonymous with "management"^ to extremely limited applications
Jackson Martendell, The Scientific Appraisal of Management (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 267.
2Alex W. Rathe, "Management Control in Business," Management
Control Systems , ed. Donald G. Malcolm and Alan J. Rowe (New York: John




such as quality assurance, cost control, and inventory management. There
has also been a tendency to consider those aspects of management concerned
with planning and review, and command and follow-up as management control.
Budgeting and financial review have also been titiea control as has pro-
duction scheduling.
There is inherent in all control systems some form of information
gathering and reporting which, it may be impliea, will be followed by a
review or analysis of the data and some appropriate action. Many experts
will insist that the control phase in management begins with the gathering
of data and ends with review and analysis of this data by its comparison
with pre-sstblished standards, ethers will insist with equal vehemence
that control must include the setting of the standards for comparison and
the implementation of the action called for by the information generated
in the process of controlling. The parameters of control, however, assume
^For some of these various concepts of control the reader is
referred to the following published works:
Frwin Haskell Schneil, Technique of Executive Control (8th ed.
New York: *fcOraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1957). ("Control is largely
wade up of the flow of orders and instructions in one direction and the
flow of reports and comments in the other," p. 2.)
T. '}. Hose and Donald B. Farr, Higher Management Control (New




U. 3. Array Headquarters, Army Service Forces Control Manual,
Vol. 1, Fundamentals of Control , 1943 ("A control office is very similar
to a management engineering fin* in private business," p. 2).
Robert V. Miller, "How to Plan and Control with PIRT," Harvard






less importance if the management process is conceptualized as cyclical
in nature as described by Urwick, or as a network wherein "... ail of
the functions of the manager are so closely interrelated that it is dif-
ficult in practice to ascertain where one function ends and another begins
. . . because the operating manager performs all of them virtually at the
same time."2
As did Fayol and Taylor, modern writers often look upon the
manager's job from different vantage (or disadvantage) points which lead
them to widely varying concepts of the role of control in business organ-
izations. It would appear therefore, that an attempt to categorize these
viewpoints would be meaningful only if the resultant groupings were on the
basis of "key ideas" rather than the perspective of "one observer. The
following groupings, which include only a portion of the literature of
management control, are intended only to indicate the major points of
emphasis of each author and are not to imply that the views of writers
shown in one category are not complimentary to those of other authors.
The categories selected for this analysis are (a) the principles of con-
trol, (b) the active element in control and (c) the informational aspects
of control.
^Urwick, op. cit ., p. 102.
2Harold Koontz, "Management Control: A Suggested Formulation of
Principles!" California Management Review , Vol. I (Winter, 1959), p. 44.
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The Principles of Control
Control, according to Professor Harold Koontz, ha© been . . .
"one of the most widely discussed and studied areas of management." "let,"
he states, "it is a functional area in which little attempt has been made
to formalize principles that might be useful to practicing managers, help-
ful in training them, and suitable for guiding research."1 Koontz proposes
fourteen "principles" of control which, he believes, if generally adopted,
can provide the conceptual framework from which a useful body of control
knowledge can be developed. These are:
1. Principle of Assurance of Objective . "Control must contribute
to the realization of objectives by detection of deviations
easily and in a manner that will indicate the required correc-
tive action. "^
2. Principle of Efficiency of Control . The control technique must
detect and make corrective action possible with the minimum of
"unsought consequences" such as increasing costs, negating
authority delegations, lowering morale, stifling creativity,
and slowing deliveries.
3. Principle of Control Responsibility . Control must be exercised
only by those responsible for the execution of plans.
U. Principle of Future Control . Control should have as its purpose
the prevention of present and future deviations from plans.




There has been a oendency, Koontz notes, to regard control as
"looking back" because so often it has been baaed on statis-
tical and accounting data referring to past periods rather
than on forecasts and predictions of future events.
5. Principle of Lirect Control . 8m most effective control tech-
nique is the assurance that qualified subordinates fill all
key positions.
6. Principle of Reflection of Plans . Control raust be tailored
to the character and structure of plans.
7. Principle of Organisational Suitability . Controls must reflect
the structure of the organization. The controls employed must
be geared to the authority and responsibility of individual
managers.
8. Principle of Inaividuality of Controls . What is meaningful
to one manager may not be so to another.
9. Principle of Standards . Every plan must be capable of ob-
jective, accurate and suitable measurement.
10. "rinciple of Strategic Control Points . Measurement must be
effected at the point or points which Will best indicate the
level of performance.
11. The Ixception Principle . Efficiency dictates that managers
devote their attention primarily to significant exceptions.
12. Principle of Flexibility of Controls . Controls should be
flexible enough to remain usable despite failure of the plan
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itself and the necessity to reframe objectives.
13. Principle of Review . Controls, if they are to remain valid
and effective, oust be periodically reviewed for suitability.
14. Principle of Action . Contr .1 Measures can be justified only
if action is taken (through appropriate planning, controlling,
organizing, staffing or directing) to correct the deviations
which are experienced or indicated. *
A more recent attempt at formulation of control "principles" is
contained in Louis A. Allen's book, The Management Profession . The author,
who is president of a management consulting firm, has based this study on
twelve years of research encompassing the observation of 335 companies and
12,000 managers. Allen states somewhat empirically that (1) management
is a profession based on science and (2) there can be developed universally
applicable principles of management. The "Allen Principles of Control"2
are as follows:
1. Principle of Least Cause . In any ftivren ff.rour. of occurrences .
a small number of causes will tend to give rise to the largest
proportion of rasuits .3
2. Principle of Point of Control . The greatest potential for
control tends to exist at the point where action takes place .
^
1Tbid. J . 50-55.
2Louis A. Allen, The Management Profession (New York: McGraw-Hill





The responsible manager Is in the best position to determine what
information he requires and when it must be available. In the past, these
determinations, according to Allen, have often been "assumed by default"
by controller departments with the result that the operating manager has
received data which he neither understood nor required. Part of the problem
has been that each functional unit in the business, within the framework of
company policy and procedural guidance, largely planned and controlled its
own operations. Coordination was then accomplished by direct liaison of
middle-level managers and through committees. The alternative which is
now made feasible, and indeed more necessary by the installation of large
capacity data processing equipment, is to consolidate the planning and
control system design and data generation facilities at the corporate
staff level. In this manner each plan can be developed within the frame-
work of the overall company objectives, and a system of data gathering and
control meeting requirements of each level of management can be developed
as an internal part of the plan.
The Active Element in Control
Jerome considers most of the problems as well as the opportunities
facing the manager in today's world to be the result of either "the com-
plexity of society or its inclination to rapid change."* If society were
static there would be little need for control — the past would be an
1Ibid., pp. 322-323.
ntfilliam Travers Jerome, III, Executive Control — The Catalyst
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961), p. 4.
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adequate guide for the future. A manager, therefore, must be able to co-
ordinate the diverse influences and activities which make up his environ-
ment. "Business controls," Jerome states, "... represent the pattern of
activity followed by the skilled executive in order to achieve some mastery
over his environment.
"
x This is accomplished by (1) understanding the
problems created by complexity and change and (2) developing useful ways
to handle these problems. "The primary purpose of a system of control,"
Jerome goes on to say, "is to set the stage for action."
The setting of this stage involves the creation of an environment
in which the energies, the loyalties and the imagination of people will
be released in order to accomplish the given ends or objectives of the
business .... In this sense, planning, programming and organizing
are part of the process of setting the stage.
^
Control has its basis in measuring and reporting but its significance
is more far reaching. Control is less concerned with catching errors or
correcting deviations than in preventing errors and recognizing potentials.
A system of common measurement enables managers to objectively appraise
the effectiveness of subordinates. Control also simplifies communications,
providing a common language especially in quantitative matters. Control is
the element that makes decentralization of authority and responsibility
possible, Jerome continues, yet it is equally important in a highly central-
ized organization, for under both there is need for measures < performance
which will dictate where to invest limited resources and to show the success
or failure of current units and the potential of new ones. The nature of




the controls employed will vary between centralized and decentralised
operations but not the factors which make it necessary.-**
The active or dynamic aspect of control is also emphasized by
Dauten, Gararaill and Robinson. * "Effective control, like effective managing,"
they state, "is active, dynamic and evolving. This means that control
cannot be accomplished indefinitely by formula except in a strictly stable
situation. "3
Control as an over-all process implies all of the following:
checking, evaluation, pre-planning, fonnulation of objectives, setting
policies, organizing, determining systems and procedures and standards
and methods, guiding, directing, motivating, bringing about coordin-
ation, restraint, correction, removing obstacles to the path of goal
attainment, and reformulating objectives .4-
The authors recognize two aspects of control, (1) that having to
do with reorganizing operational activities to achieve performance standards
and (2) the more forward looking aspect having to do with re-planning or
the modification of objectives, policies, systems, procedures and budgets.
The effects of the exercise of control in this context are illustrated in
the diagrams which follow. In figure 2-1, page 28, the deviation at point
A is slight and of little significance; however, the deviation at point B
Ibid ., p, 6.
Paul M. Dauten, Jr., Homer L. Gaamiil, and Stanley C. Robinson,
"Emerging Concepts of Managerial Control," Current Issues and Emerging
Concepts in Management: Readings from the Academy of Management , ed.
~aul ". ?aut«n, Jr., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), pp. 136-
150.




Policy, standard, or guide
(What is considered at this
6tage to he the most efficient
pathway to reach the objective).
Performance
Fig. 2-1.—Performance deviation from policy or standarda
a5ource: Dauten, Gamraill, and Robinson, op. cit ., p. 139.
• *.
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is of a magnitude to warrant investigation. An analysis indicates that it
consists of a correctible element B» and an uncorrectible element B that
implies the original standard may be improper. As a result of this analysis,
it is determined that policy or control standards should be modified. The
original performance, compared to the new policy or guide lines Is shown
in figure 2-2. The deviation at 5» is the same correctible element shown
in figure 2-1.
Correction of the deviation, figure 2-3, page 30, results in per-
formance, which except for the slight departure at point A is well within
acceptable tolerances. Although the authors do not point this out, the
deviation S' may have occurred from over-ccrrecting to prevent further
deviation at point A. Irrespective of the cause, however, the corrective
action to prevent the overrun at point B should be initiated relatively
close to point A. The authors emphasise this aspect by stating that
measurements should be taken at the critical points where performance is
moat likely to indicate deviation from plan. The authors also state that
the control readings must be promptly reported to the appropriate indi-
vidual with authority to initiate corrective action.
Information Aspects of Control
A sharpened focus on management control together with the avail-
ability of improved means for processing data has caused more perceptive
investigation of management information requirements. This, in turn, has




Revised policy, standard or
guide (A more efficient and
effective pathway to reach
existing or newly clarified
objectives).
Performance
Fig. 2-2.—Revision of policy or standard*
Source: Dauten, Gamill, and Robinson, op. cit
., p. li*0.
Revised policy, standard or
guide (A more efficient and
effective pathway to reach
existing or newly clarified
objectives)*
Corrected Performance
Fig. 2-3.—Revision of policy or standard and correction of
performance6
aSource: Dauten, Gammill, and Robinson, op. cit ., p. 140.
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Douglas Sherwin writing in Dun's Review and Modern Industry states
"The essence of control is action which adjusts operations to predetermined
standards, and i&s basis is information in the hands of managers . "*
Sherwin goes on to say managers control adherence to the policies,
plans, objectives, structure and procedures of the organization. Control
is not concerned with establishing a system of internal checks (sometimes
referred to as internal audit or internal control); this is a function of
organization, which segregates the record-keeping and custodianship re-
sponsibilities and provides for a periodic reconciliation of the two.
Whereas the system of internal checks is "built-in," "static," and "pre-
ventative," control is "active," "continual," "after-the-fact" and "cor-
rective." The budget of an enterprise, likewise, is not a method of
exercising control* It is related to control only in the sense that it is
utilized as a basis for reporting progress against an approved plan. The
other functions of the budget process, i.e., presenting objectives, plans
and programs in financial terms and defining responsibilities and authority
limits, are related to the planning and organizing activities.2
In addressing the question of who should exercise control, Sherwin
concludes that the ultimate responsibility for control rests with the
individual responsible for establishing the standards against which results
are to be measured. Long-range planning and the approval of operating plans
1Douglas S. Sherwin, "The Meaning of Control," Dun's Review and





are responsibilities of top management, hence, "ultimate control" must also
rest high in the organisational structure. This is not to imply that control
should be exercised exclusively at the top; but, rather, along with other
authority and responsibility, should be delegated to the lowest practical
organizational level so that it becomes a responsibility of subordinate
managers to control the adherence of operations in the system they have
established. Control is, therefore, a responsibility of all levels of
management. Rather than a single set of controls serving all managers,
Sherwin visualises the control over specific operations and informational
requirements of the controllers changing with some being added or relin-
quished at successive levels in the organizational structure. He describes
it in this manner:
. . . the process of fading out and shading in of information is
continued as you move up the managerwnt pyramid until, just as in the
visible spectrum the colors at one end are wholly unlike those at the
other, the information reported to the top is wholly different from
the Information reported to first-line managers.
Replacing the need for specific and detailed control information
at the higher organizational level is the need for data which Sherwin refers
to as "Information for Aiming and Planning." This two-part data flow is
shown in figure 2-4, page 33. Although separate loops *re indicated, the
data flowing in both may at times be composed of similar elements. But
because of the different purposes for which it is to e used, it is most
often diesimilar — each category of information being conceptually dif-





























The Informational Aspects of Control
Arnold Bach, writing in the Harvard Business Heview for July-
August, 1954, observes the close relation between control and organisation.
The success of any plan of organization, according to Emch, is dependent
upon the system of control which must be an integral part of it. In
other words, an executive's ability to function effectively at any level
is determined largely by the quality and kinds of information coming to
him. Frach states it in this manner:
We have a job to do — a line of service or products to make
and sell at a profit. There are a number of persons involved in the
doing of that job. Hence, we organise ourselves in some fashion so
that each one of us nas specific, assigned tasks, all more or less
related to one another. And we try to see that each key individual
has a clear understanding of his functions, of his lines of authority
downward, and his line of responsibility upward.
But, if we should go only this far, we would not go far enough.
We must also deteriaine what each of these individuals needs in the way
of facts and figures in order to perforin his job effectively. This,
then, is the problem of control: to match the responsibilities of
every key position with the management information necessary for the
effective and efficient execution of those responsibilities. Control
itself can be defined as the making of decisions and taking of actions
required by the responsibilities of each position, i.e., the proper
performance of each executive according to the requirement of his
position.
Now, some readers may object to this concept on the ground
that it does not even mention the familiar rudiments of control,
traditionally conceived. Tou may be prompted to say: "Control means
making sure that actual results conform to desired results, and this
involves three basic functions: (a) setting standards of satisfactory
performance; (b) checking results to see how they compare with the
standards; and (c) taking corrective action where actual results do
not meet the standards.
I have no quarrel with this concept, except that these functions
ought to be, and in fact must be, built into the organisation structure
as part and parcel of the responsibilities and authorities of every
key position. They should net be segregated and pat on a li3t of
functions under the heading "control. 11
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This bring* us to the basic flaw of most control systems as
well as of most plans of organisation. Control and organisation have
generally been treated independently of each other, thus missing the
point of how the organisation is to »*ork in practice, or of what the
executives are trying to control in the operations. Actually, organ-
ization and control are inseparable when there is effective manage-
ment; they cannot function properly without each other .*
Nearly anyone in an organisation receiving a well-designed, concise
and clear report of operations compared with plan can discern deviations
from the plan. Merely discovering unsatisfactory conditions, as J^ach in-
dicates, is not control. Control, which must be accomplished within the
framework of organizational plans, involves action — action to prevent
deviations from plans and to correct errors.
Control action must be taken by those executives who have been
delegated the authority and responsibility for the operations involved.
It makes no sense, ffech elaborates, to assign a person specific responsi-
bility for an operational area, including the goals associated therewith,
and then through continuous "denials, restrictions, limitations, and
specifications," inhibit his ability for appropriate response. If the
"nominally responsible" manager does succeed under these circumstances, it
is probably because of an almost super-human effort rather than because of
the overriding decisions enanating from above. If, on the other hand, he
fails, there is a question of who is responsible and therefore accountable
for the failure. If an organisation plan is to be of any value, it must
show specifically who is responsible for the preventative or corrective
action.
^
^Arnold F. Finch, "Control Means Action," Harvard Business Review
.
July-August, 1°54, p. 94-95.
2
Ibld .» p. 97.
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For most functions in large organisations direct observation is
insufficient for the exercise of control. So a system of information,
designed to meet the needs of responsible managers at all levels is re-
quired. While the information system does not need to follow the formal
command channels of the organization chart, it must provide a flow of
necessary data to all responsible executives identified in the plan. The
flow of information must be both timely enough to bo of genuine value in
the exercise of control and adequate in terms of being neither too little
nor too much. Each believes a control system should require only what is
"absolutely necessary" in the way of reports, data and statistics. He offers
thi6 maxim for executives to follow in determining what is absolutely neces-
sary: "In accord with your responsibilities and authority, can you or
should you do anything about the information that is presented tc you and,
if so, what?"x if the response is negative, the data in the hands of the
recipient is something between purely informative and whollj- useless — it
is not control data.
Ronald Daniel, a member of a well known management consulting firm
finds there exists a widespread "management information crisis . . • not
in the sense of there not being enough information, but in terms of rel-
evancy for setting objectives, for shaping alternative strategies, for making
decisions, and for measuring results against planned goals."
1Ib£d., p. 98.
^C. Ronald Daniel, "Management Information Crisis," Harvard Business
Review , Septeuiber-Gctober, 1961, p. 111.
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This problem, according to Daniel, is caused by a gap between in-
formation systems which have remained static and organisation structures
which have undergone extensive changes. These changes have resulted in the
creation of new positions, new responsibilities and the modification of
patterns of authority, all of which have originated new requirements for
information, both in substance and in distribution. Unfortunately, as
Daniel observes, companies are suffering an information void — "often
without realizing it."-*-
The link between organisation structure and information require-
ments is inseparable. Information is the media for translation of a state-
ment of duties into action. The factual needs of large, widely diversified
and expanding companies are immense and include data which is both financial
and non-financial in character, and internal and external to the firm. It
is often taken for granted, Daniel indicates, that to a large degree informa-
tion necessary for a manager to perform his duties tends to flow naturally
to the job. This is partially true in companies involved in only one in-
dustry group or that have small, well integrated management teams in which
information systems are based on frequent face to face contacts, coordinating
committees, frequent trade contacts and other less formal means. This type
of information system may well serve the small or medium-sized enterprise.
However, most large organizations, with extended communication channels and
broad responsibilities for top managers, must rely more on formal methods





The first step in designing a management information system, ac-
cording to Daniel, is to determine each executive's information require-
ments based on: (a) his role in the organization, (b) his responsibilities
and the authority he holds, and (c) his relationships with other members
of the firm. On this basis, the procedural network should be established
to convert both internally and externally derived raw data into information
which is appropriate and usable at each executive position in the network.
This approach requires a tailoring of the data, recognizing the specific
needs of individual executives according to both their hlerarchlal location
and intended use of the data. Specifically, Daniel emphasizes that infor-
mation which is useful and desirable for long-range planning is far dif-
ferent from control data. This distinction is illustrated in figure 2-5
page 39, which categorizes the types of planning information as (1) en-
vironmental — concerned with the setting in which the firm currently
operates or can expect to operate in the future; (2) competitive — dealing
with the current position and plans of important rivals j and (3) internal —
iindicating the firm's own strengths and weaknesses.
Control data, although it also includes elements obtained from
both external and internal sources, has quite different characteristics.
Daniel emphasizes these contrasts between planning and control information:
3-* Coverage — Good planning information is not compartmentalized
by functions. Indeed, it seeks to transcend the divisions that exist
in a company and to provide the basis on which integrated plans can be
made. In Contrast, control information hews closely to organisational
lines so that it can be used to measure performance and help in holding
























2. Length of time — Planning information covers fairly long
periods of time — months and years rather than days and weeks —
and deals with trends. Thus, although it should be regularly
prepared, it is not developed as frequently as control information.
3. Degree of detail — Excessive detail is the quicksand of
intelligent planning. Unlike control, where precision and minute
care do have a place, planning (and particularly long-range planning)
focuses on the major outlines of the situation ahead ....
4. Orientation — Planning information should provide insights
into the future. Control information shows past results and the
reasons for them.*
Summary
Control in the management sense has found many meanings. Fayol's
concept of insuring that events conform to plan through examination of
results, finding weaknesses and errors and preventing their recurrence has,
through the years, been expanded, modified, and redefined to become appro-
priate for describing nearly any activity a manager may perform. Because
control involves intelligence gathering and analysis, some writers have
found control to be the basis for management planning. A clearer insight
into the nature of information and its relationship to executive responsi-
bility has caused a wider realisation of the considerable difference in the
types and quantities of information required for the various management
purposes. To a degree, this represents a return to the Fayolian concept of
control. But management thought has tended never to remain static. After
completion of the first full cycle there has been a renewed interest in the
development of a multi-purpose informational flow within an organisation
XIbid.. pp. 117-119.

uthat will insure unity of purpose through management control, while at the
same time it provides data for formulating long-range strategies appropriate
to environmental conditions. This "holistic" approach to management theory
emphasizes the interrelationship of activities within a total organizational
"system" and shows how internal stability is achieved through the adequate
flow of information to and from organizational control centers. This con-
cept of an organization has its origins in the relatively new doctrines of
management science which is the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER III
THE MANAGEMENT SCIENCE CONCEPT OF CONTROL IN ORGANIZATION
lyndall Urwick at midpoint in World Kar II commented:
At the moment there is admittedly, an insufficient basis in the
physical sciences for an exact science of administration. The chief
cause of the disaster under which humanity is at present suffering
is a lack of balance between man's knowledge of the physical sciences
and his grasp of ths laws of social organisation necessary to control
the power which that knowledge has created.^-
Ironically, it was precisely that global confrontation that gave
stimulus to scientific research into administrative problems. This effort,
in the words of Jay Forrester, a modern day management scientist, has
brought management ". . . from an art, based only on experience, to a
profession, based on an underlying structure of principles and science."
The Origins of Management Science
Management science has been traced back to Charles Babbage, who
in the early nineteenth century advocated a rational or "scientific" ap-
proach to production problems' or, more commonly, to Frederick W. Taylor
Urwick, The Elements . . . . op. cit .. p. 8.
Jay W. Forrester, Industrial Dynamics (Cambridge, Mas3: M.I.T.
Press, and New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961), p. 1.
-^Donald J. Clough, Concepts in Management Science (Englewood




and his contemporaries in the scientific management movement. In retro-
spect, however, these earlier efforts wouic appear to be core closely
related to engineering than to an applied science. The beginning of the
modern concepts of management science is usually identified with the efforts
of a number of scientists during the early 1%0's, both in this country and
Great Britain, to solve military logistic and decision proolerrvS.
In the United States at this time, a group of scientists under
Professor . . S. Blockett were engaged in performing analysis and de-
veloping data for decision-making regarding utilization of milit .ry resources,
Although concerned initially only with the technical aspects, these inquiries
led to what in essence were managerial problems. For txam;;le, dlockett's
group studied "the radar interceptor defence system as an integrated roan-
machine system involving human, technological and operational management
aspects."*' In England, scientists were engaged in programming British
fighter aircraft during the Battle of Britain, an effort which resulted in
3
"unprecedented effectiveness with the limited resources of the RAF."
At the close of ^orld V.ar II, the attention of the scientists was
directed to the problems of nmnagement in commercial enterprise. Their
wartime efforts had sharpened the scientists' insight into the decision
^George Kozmetaky and Paul Kircher, Liectronic Computers and
Management Control (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956),
Donald J. dough, Concepts in Management Science (knglewood
Cliffs, If. J.i Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 26.
-'Kozmetsky and Kircher, op. cit ., p. 121.

uprocess in the economic sphere and led to the realization that further
investigation of this subject could be rewarding both to the scientists
and to th? managers who could directly benefit in terms of improved
methodology. Prior to World War II, Kozmetsky and Kircher point out,
managers tended to view their work as an art and scientists had little
interests in business problems for it was not "professionally acceptable"
for a scientist to work in commercial fields unless engaged in product
research efforts.
The early work of the management scientists indicated business
problems to be far more complicated and hence more challenging than most
scientists realized. During the war, for example, a group of scientists
developed a highly effective search theory for the location of submarines.
Subsequently they attempted, without success, to apply this theory to what
was assumed to be the relatively "simple" problem of locating customers for
retail sales operations.
Management science has made a significant contribution to the
practice of management. As is true of any worthwhile endeavor, it arose
to fill a need. Clough has stated it in this way:
Because of the size and complexity of modern organizations,
administrative decisions often affect large numbers of people and
enormous quantities of capital. The many interacting variables in
a large operation are not generally amenable to quick-and-easy
analysis, and in fact cannot always be identified explicitly. In
addition, feedback on the results of many executive decisions is not
available for months or years, so that trial and error judgements





science has grown out of efforts to develop decision-making criteria
and operating strategies which are effective in the face of the in-
creasing complexities and higher stakes of modern military and indus-
trial operations .-*•
Operationally, management science can be defined as the applica-
tion of the methodology, reasonings and sometimes the findings of other
disciplines, including physics, chemistry, biology, physiology, economics,
and experimental psychology, to the study of organization and organiza-
tional activities. Management science is inter-disciplinary in its approach.
It has been said: "Management science uses what it needs and what is avail-
able to solve executive problems."*
The Methodology of Management Science
Management science as described by Kozmetsky and Kircher includes
these technical steps:
1, Initial exploration of the problem and approximate formulation
of the relationship between relevant factors,
2, Followed by a more precise identification and measurement of
the factors involved,
3, More formal expression of the relationships between the factors
and desired results, often by construction of a mathematical
model
o
4, Testing of the model to provide a basis for improved procedures,
processes, decisions, etc. The resultant solution may be





optimum or merely satisfactory or may instead indicate the
manner in which the model can be improved to provide a more
desirable result. •*-
In practice, this approach is not greatly dissimilar to the so
called non-scientific, intuitive, or heuristic method of problem solving
and in its application at times may be difficult to distinguish. In both,
the problem is frequently subdivided into constituent, more manageable parts
which are then solved or treated as if they were solved. The parts are
then reassembled into a composite solution. The basic difference between
the scientific and non-scientific approach however, is the extent to which
the problem is defined and the manner in which it is defined and the way
in which measurements and the relationships between parts are expressed, re-
combined and tested for validity.
The working model of the organization or a component thereof may
be developed either through observation of the organization, its inter-
related constituents and the environment in which it operates, or by appli-
cation through analogous reasoning of the findings resulting from observa-
tion of similiarily constituted systems. The systems from which the ana-
logies are drawn may be similar organizations or units or, as is frequently
the case in the scientific approach to management, a parallelism is de-
veloped between phenomena which occur in the physical systems and in the
economic and social realms.





Information-Feedback Control Theory exemplifies abstraction of
phenomena recognized in physical systems and their application to the
management systems of human enterprise. This theory has had considerable
impact in recent years in the design efforts for management information
and control systems both in military and civilian organizations. The con-
cept of information-feedback and control in human oriented systems had
its origins in 1938 when a group of scientists from various disciplines
began to meet at Harvard University to discuss common problems of control.
The efforts of this group brought about renewed interest in von Bertalanffy's
General System Theory1 as the several different lines of thought, which
these scientists had developed independently, were beginning to show common
features. A natural unity was perceived in the design principles applicable
to electronic controllers for machines, the mathematical expression of the
behavior of information in electrical communication systems, and the flow
of information in cerebral systems of higher animals.* Norbert "wiener, who
was to become the catalyst for this effort, coined the word "Cybernetics"
(from the Greek word "Kubernetes" moaning steersman or governor) to de-
scribe the entire field of communication and control theory as it is found
in machines, higher animals and social and economic organizations.-* The
^ludwig von Bertalanffy, "General System Theory," reprinted in
General Systems Yearbook , Vol. I, 1956.
Stafford Beer, Cybernetics and Manafienent (New York: John *»iley
& Sons, Inc., 1959), p-c. 1-?.
^Morbert V'iener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and




guiding principles of Cybernetics have been identified by Honomichi as
these
:
Organic life can be approximated (if not explained) by mathe-
matical reasoning.
Communication and control are closely related.
A better understanding of machines will help nan to better
understand organic life. Or.- conversely, man can improve machines
by imitating life processes.1
Control ie thus perceived a necessary attribute of any viable
system. Systems, biological, psychological, social, economic and so on,
remain viable through their ability to utilize feedback information to
overcome ". . . nature's tendency toward disorder by adjusting its parts
to various purposive ends. "3
In general, a system in which feedback control is present will
exhibit these characteristics:
1. The system will be subject to some "disturbing" influence.
2. A goal or desired state for the system can be defined. This
may be either fixed or varied arbitrarily by a "goal-setting agent" posses-
sing learning and computer capabilities.
3. Because of disturbing influences, the fluctuations of goals,
or both, the actual state will not be the same as the desired state.
^Jack J. Honomichi, "Machines That Think Like lien," Management
Review , September 1963, pp. 39-40.
*A system has been defined as ". . . anything that consists of parts
connected together" (*3eer, op. cit
., p. 9.) or ". . .a collection of states
together with the rules whereby they change" (Gordon Pask, An Approach to
Cybernetics . Science Today Series, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961
,
p. H5.
^Wiener, op. cit .. p. 27.
Plough, op. cit .. p. 81.
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Definitionally, feedback control is ". . .an operation v/hich
tends to reduce the difference, or the error between the desired state
and the actual state. (,i This implies the error must be "sensed" or
"measured" and used to automatically cause corrective action to be taken.
Also implied in this definition is the axiom that the appropriate control
action is determined by the magnitude of the error and the rate of change
of the error.
Clough emphasizes the Importance of timely control response,
pointing out that in many systems there is an appreciable surveillance
lag between the actual necessity for taking action and the point in time
when that necessity is recognized by the "controller."*
The concept of feedback control in social systems is similar to
the homeostasis tendency of living organisms and the control exercised by
servo-mechanical devices in electro-mechanical systems. The thermostatically
controlled heating system provides an excellent example of the operation
of a feedback control mechanism in the physical world and by anology, a
homeostat in any "naturally occurring" viable system.3 The thermostat,
heating device and enclosed space form a closed-loop control system in
*Ibld .. p. 81.
2Ibld .
3a homeostat is defined as "any of a general class of electro-
magnetic, electro-cheaical or electronic contrivances which effectively
simulate the
. . . maintenance of homeostasis by any viable physio-
logical, biological, political, social, economic or other . . . systems.
"
From: LTentative Version! A Selected Glossary of Terms with Particular
Reference to Concepts Associated with "Cybernetic Management" and the
"Information Technology," an unpublished undated work by Dr. R. F. Ericson,
Professor of Business Administration, The George Washington University.
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which the heating device effects the temperature of the enclosed space
and the thermostatic control device turns the furnace on or off whenever
the temperature within the space reaches the threshold Units. The
thermostat exercises control by comparing the actual performance, i.e.,
the amount cf heat within the room with the desired state and transmitting
a control message to the heating device. The control message may direct
the heater to turn-on or turn-off, or if performance is tending toward the
desired range, to continue in its present status. After the desired range
or "zero" variance has been achieved, control messages (which are a reflec-
tion of the variance) are no longer generated and, hence, information
ceases to flow in the system. The thermostatic control system is described
as "closed looped" or "closed cycle" as there is no direct sensing of the
disturbing influences external to the system. These external influences,
nevertheless, affect the ability of the system to achieve the desired
state. To replace the thermostatic device with a human decision-maker
does not alter the "closed-loopness" of the system; however, in this system
the desired temperature range would not be explicit and held constant but,
rather, would change because of the interaction of other uncontrolled vari-
ables with the controlled variable of temperature. The human decision-maker,
in this case, would act not as a single sensor but as a number of sensors re-
acting to such variables as humidity, time of day, physical activity and
psychological state, all of which interact in a complex way.
^-H. U. James, N. 3. Nichols, and R. 5. Pftlllips (eds.) Theory of
Servo?qechani3m8 . (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1947), p. 62.
2Clough, or?, cit ., pp. 8?-83.
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In the thermostat or human controlled system there will usually
be some overshooting of the aesired range of temperature because of (a)
the time lag between the output of heat and its actual delivery to the
enclosed space, (b) the recognition of the temperature change by the
controller and (c) the overall time required to elicit the directed response
from the heating unit. It should be noted that the control message, because
of the time delay involved, is baaed not on the heater output at that
specific point in time but upon its previous output. The total delay in
the system roust be calculated from the time the accumulated heater output
was sufficient to achieve the desired temperature range in the enclosed
space. Feedback control or Cybernetic devices always cause a performance
cycle of an amplitude and length governed by the characteristics of the
feedback loop in the system.
The Systems Concept of An Organisation
The systems concept of an organization emerges more clearly when
it is compared with the traditional, organization chart, model of the firm.
Organization charts of the type shown in figure 3-1, page 52 are intended
to depict formal relationships among people, processes or both. In figure
3-1 the heavy lines indicate the chain-of-coinmand or communication channels
connecting line processes; the lighter lines indicate the staff activities
and altogether comprise the total line and staff complex. The chief
limitation of this type of presentation is that it is unrealistic in the
sense that it avoids recognition of informal communication channels which
exist in all organisations and because it provides no clear insight as to
''Joseph W. McGuire, Theories of Business Behavior (Englewood Cliffs:
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 2k,
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Fig. 3-1.—A simplified organization charta
aSource: Clough, op, cit
., p. 92.
Fig, 3-2.—A simplified communications chart of an organizationa




how the communication process functions.
The feedback control concept clarifies this relationship by depicting
the organization as a system of financial, production and sales sub-systems
(figure 3-2, page 52). Input to the system consists of labor, orders,
capital, materials of production and process information. The output con-
sists of products and services. The disturbing influences include fluctu-
ations in customer orders, market price of inputs, availability of material
and labor and changes in labor and social pressure, government regulations
etc. The system and its component sub-systems each include goal-setters,
controllers, information-processors and sensors.
The goal-setter of the overall corporate entity, i.e., the Board
of Directors, sets goals and objectives and receives from the controller
(usually the President or General Manager) periodic reports on performance
and changes in disturbing influences. The goal-setter determines the
desired state of the system and, if satisfied that the control circuits
will perform properly, permits the controller to freely act to achieve the
desired state. The controller employs an information processor which may
be his own brain or an extension of his brain — a staff organisation — to
decode and analyse messages and to process and encode communications to
other parts of the system. The information-processor communicates directly
with the controller but also maintains two-way communication with the con-
trolled system and receives information from outside the system. Ideally,
Plough, op. cit .. pp. 90-91.
2The material concerning the application of feedback control theory
to organisations has be* n adapted from Clough, op. cit .. pp. 85-90.
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these communications should not be for the purpose of exercising direct
control as this is an exclusive function of the controller. But, to
facilitate information-processing and to permit the system components to
obtain clarification of control messages and assistance in subsidiary
decision-making, direct communication between the information-processor and
subordinates is often permitted. Without the direct link between the staff
and components, controllers would be unable to handle all the message
traffic, some of which is relatively unimportant to the prime control
function.
The sensors, who gather both internal and external information for
the controller, may be subordinate line managers but, it should be recog-
nized, these individuals may have goals which are in conflict with those
of the formal organisation and, when acting as sensors, may become "noise
generators'* or "information filters." This limitation is sometimes over-
come by use of staff-assistants to the controller as sensors or by imple-
mentation of automated techniques for the sensing and reporting of control
and environmental data.
The total organizational system, as indicated previously, is com-
posed of many sub-systems governed by lower-order control circuits. There
exists, therefore, a hierarchy of goal-setters, control loops within control
loops and individual controllers functioning as goal-setters to the sub-
ordinate controllers. This scheme involves a complex chain of interrelated
decision-makers who are continuously influencing and being influenced by
the decisions of others. The strongest influence is exerted by the prime
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goal-setter; however, information generated in the lower-order circuits
also exerts considerable influence because it affects the "payoff estimates"
and the choices of alternate plans by the higher-order goal setters.
The relationship of the system, sub-systems and environment is
shown in figure 3-2, page 52 which depicts the flow of materials (heavy
lines) fro?- suppliers through the states of production to customers.
Superimposed on the flow chart is the communication circuits utilized to
control this process, (solid lines) which connect the goal-setters, con-
trollers, information-processor and sensors who are a part of the high-
order and low-order systems. A separate channel of cummunication (ciott-ed
lines) carries information to the assets controller regarding exchange of
assets within the system. The separate circuit for assets data emphasizes
that thi3 information is not utilized to exercise control.
The study of an information feedback control system is, in actu-
ality, a study of how information is used for planning and control purposes
and demonstrates how the structure of the system, time delays and ampiifica-
tion may induce unstable fluctuations in system performance. Forrester
describes these characteristics as they relate to behavior of mechanical,
biological and social systems:
The structure of a system tells how the parts are related to
one another. Delays always exist in the availability of information,
in making decisions based on the information, and in taking action
on the decisions. Amplification usually exists throughout such
systems, especially in the decision policies of our industrial and
social systems. Amplification is manifested when an action is more
forceful than might at first seem to be implied by the information
inputs to the governing decisions. *•
^Jay Vi. Forrester, Industrial Dynamic
s
(Cambridge, Mass.: X.l.T.
Press, and Mew York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961), pp. 15-16.
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Forrester advocates simulation , or experimentation with a mathe-
matical model, to explain the effects of system structure, delays and
amplification on the six basic flows in an industrial system — informa-
tion, money, customer orders, material, personnel and capital equipment —
and as a guide in system design and policy ana procedure development. Ex-
perimentation is necessary because mathematical analysis has not reached a
state whereby general analytical solutions can be achieved for problems
as complex as those encountered in business. Simulation also provides
the framework for integrating the functional areas of the organisation —
marketing, production, accounting, etc. This technique has great utility
not only in systems development but, according to Forrester, also for
unifying management education which currently is "highly fragmentized" and
presented to the student "as a sequence of unrelated subjects. 1*^
In this regard Forrester's thesis can be considered complementary
to Fayoi's. Both are concerned with the effective teaching of a management
curriculum; both have focused on the integrating activities of chief execu-
tives of organisations who must bring together the contributions of the
various functional areas into a common effort toward a common goal. Fayol*s
attention was directed to the task of identifying the methodology employed
by the successful administrator. Forrester, conversely, considers the
observation and recording of human experience in the arena of management
to be of limited value in building a useful body of management thought.
^•




"As long as there is no orderly underlying scientific base," he maintains,
"these experiences retiain special cases. The lessons are poorly trans-
ferable either in time or in space. "^ Lacking the mathematical tools
to proceed from general concepts or "principles" of management as they
have developed over the years to an analytical proof of their validity,
management l s scientific base must be developed through controlled experi-
mental manipulation of the significant variables to determine satisfactory
solutions to management problems. The electronic computer has made
Forrester's "Industrial dynamics" simulation technique feasible.
Smflanary
This chapter has covered only limited aspects of the rapidly ex-
panding management science effort. Closely related to systems theory and
simulation are the management science developments in decision theory,
statistical sampling, probability theory, game theory and other aids to
management deciBion-making.
The considerable emphasis given in management science to information-
feedback and control in organizations has been to some extent, a natural
outgrowth of the rapidly expanding technology of information handling
brought about by the introduction in the last decade of the electronic
business computer and the implementation of the revolutionary, new decision
tools which allow the automation of certain "routine" decisional processes
^Ibiu., p. 2.
2Ibid .» p. 18.
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as well as the consideration of additional data inputs and relationships in
complex, non-routine, decision-making.
Management scientists and the management traditionalists will agree
that effective planning, the establishment of realistic and measurable goals
and the efficient communication and utilization of information are requisites
for management control. Not all will agree, however, with the management
scientists' concepts of the organisational system or that information-feed-
back control theory adequately describes the management process. Jerome,
for example, considers the concepts of cybernetics and the theory of servo-
mechanisms appropriate for machines and some shop processes but "too rigid
for the world of people. "^
System theory, however, is helpful in gaining an understanding of
the processes which occur in human organizations, since it is easier to
study structurally analogous but simpler systems and generalize from the
less complex to the mere complex. This approach is valid provided the
analogies are well founded and generalization is not carried too far. The
systems approach is used as the basis for a discussion of design consider-
ations applicable to management information and control systems in the next
chapter of this paper.
1Jerome, op. cit ., pp. 31-32.
William G. Scott, Human Relations in Management: A Behavioral
Science Approach (Hoaewood, 111.: Pdchard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), p. 151.

CHAPTER IV
RATI0U8 IN . nm QF HAMACai£KT
m i m
Information in some form is the basis for all managerial actions.
Information received by an executive and enriched by his own ideas and
experiences leads to the formulation of policy and plans of action and to
their implementation. As plans become operational, information provides
a basis for replanning and for th« prevention and correction of deviations.
In the past., managers have often found their decisions to be less accurate
than they had expected, or not implemented as timely and effectively as
they had expected because the information which they had been provided was
inaccurate, lacked completeness or was excessively slow. VTith equipments
currently available for the manipulation, storage and cosmunication of data,
it is technically feasible to develop an information system that will
provide an array of reports that is timely, accurate and appropriate for
all centers of managerial planning and control in even the largest and most
complex organizations.
All organisations have a management information system. It may
consist of any number of combinations of word-of-mouth reporting, accounting
1James D. Gallagher, Management Information systems and the Computer






records and reports, memoranda, meetings, conferences, and regular and
non-recurring statistical and narrative reports prepared manually or with
electro-mechanical equipments. In large organizations, because of the
complexity and variety of the problems faced, an electronic computer may
be installed to handle advanced statistical computations involving large
quantities of "raw data" and to facilitate the storage, retreval and trans-
mission of data within the organization. The ability to handle large
amounts of data and to report this information rapidly throughout the organ-
ization does not in itself assure an improved management information system.
ctronic data processing, with its capacity to produce vast amounts
of information, in actuality, can be a disservice to managements. Unless
business computers are prooerly utilized and incorporated into a well designed
information system, executives in search of the necessary data to carry out
their responsibilities "may be forced to ingest and digest reams of general
purpose information not especially designed for any specific management job.' 1*
Gallagher considers the most important aspect of data processing to be the
proper selection , arrangement and distribution of management information.
Yet, he finds:
respite all the advances in data processing, a breakdown in
the . . . preparation of managerial planning *nd control reports
and their proper utilization ... is all too frequently observed.
The underlying reason is th^t not only the systems planners who
design data-processing programs but also those who actually manage
the systems often prove to be unaware of the exact needs of manage-
ment for clear and continuing reports on the total course of a
business. When this kind of failure occurs, the usual course of
data-processing personnel is to take refuge in the preparation of
1Ibid
. t pp. 12-13.
F. W. Cannon, "Project Inter-Loc," I^ata Processing for Kan^rerrtent ,
June, 1964, p. 33.
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data reports; the expensive and complex data-processing equipment
is used almost exclusively for "electronic record keeping" and
the preparation for management of tabulated reports which are in
fact only the results of consolidating "raw data" records without
reference to the real needs of management. 3-
Previous chapters of this paper have briefly covered the tradi-
tional approach to management control and the management science concept
of information and control. In this chapter both contributions will be
considered in their application to the design of management information
and control systems. 2 The terms "management information and control
systems" and "integrated business systems" are frequently used interchang-
ably. Both refer to integrated information systems, usually computer
based, which combine the various data sub-systems — production, scheduling,
purchasing, inventory and others — into a unified system serving the whole
of management .3 ^n integrated system has also been described as a company-
wide linking of the events which originate information with those events
which occur "whenever and wherever someone uses the information."^
The systems approach to management information and control emphasizes
the existence of sub-systems for the sensing of management data and the
exercising of control and their innerconnection to form a single high-order
system which serves and is served by all parts of the organisation. The
systems view is highly useful in that it depicts the Interrelationships of
1Gallagher, op. cit ., p. 13.
2To some extent the term "management information and control
systems" is redundant. Information is the basis for and effects imple-
mentation of control and, of course, a control system carries informa-
tion. The term is useful, however, because it does emphasize the two-
fold purpose of the system which is to carry information for both plan-
ning and controlling.
-^Gallagher, op. cit .. p. 115.
%ozmetsky and Kircher, op. cit .. p. 169.
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the various operational processes which, as Forrester points out, "will
often be more important than the separate components themselves . •** loo
often there is a tendency to focus on the functional or specialized
activities of an organisation rather than on the unified effort required to
achieve the organizational goals. Peter Drucker has discussed this problem
in an article on long-range planning. "There is, after all," he stresses,
"no functional profit, no functional loss, no functional investment, no
functional risk . . . ."*
Conversely, there is danger in the "holistic" view of management
of overlooking the desirable qualities inherent in non-integrated, func-
tionally oriented information and control systems, of failing to note the
highly important differences in the information requirements of the various
goal setters and controllers and of giving inadequate consideration to the
related question of the appropriate location of control centers within the
organization. These aspects of system design will be considered in the
balance of this chapter through an interfacing of recent writings on the
subject of management information and control systems with the traditional
and management science concepts presented in earlier chapters.
Measurement of Information and Control
System Performance
As has been noted previously, the too heavy emphasis on functional
efficiency may hinder the achievement of over-all organizational goals.
^Forrester, op. clt .. p. 6.
2?eter F. Drucker, "Long-Ra
Science," Management Science . April, 1959, p. 2A7.
* nge Planning, Challenge to Management
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Charles Stein, Jr., has cemented on this problem:
In a truly integrated management information system, the basic
inputs will be combined, changed in form, merged, consolidated, and
analyzed so that the information needs of every level of management
are met in a timely, accurate, and useful fashion with minimal
duplication of input data. The interrelationships of the various
functions and operations will be so accurately reflected that every
decision . . . will optimize over-all company goals rather than
those of any particular part or function ....
The ability of the truly integrated information system to portray
the overall operations in their relationship© to company objectives
can have a significant effect on the traditional concepts of organ-
ization .... The tasks required to carry out the operations of a
business are divided among several functional suborganizations ....
Each of these functional units either is given or develops its
own objectives. The inventory manager, for example, may have the
objective of keeping his inventory levels as low as possible; the
traffic manager may seek to move everything by means of the cheapest
. . . delivery requirements; the production manager may want long
manufacturing runs with a minimum of engineering changes; the engineer
may want to change the product every time a good idea comes along; and
the sales force may want large finished-goou inventories and rapid
deliveries so that customer orders can be filled promptly.
These functional objectives make it very difficult for top manage-
ment to determine what is good for the company as a whole ....
Thus the best decision for the over-all operation may require
what appears to the functional managers to be unnecessary expenditures
for transportation, warehouse space, or inventory investment.
^
Robert Gordon emphasized this approach requires that two commonly
held impressions persisting in management today be overcome:
A total information system, I would like the reader to infer,
is for the company first, and for its subordinate parts last. The
implications of this rather simple-sounding view are considerable for
^•Charles Stein, Jr., The Changing Dimensions of Office Manage-
ment a A. M. A. Management Report No. 41, (New York: American Management
Association, 1961), pp. 83-84.
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it contradicts two very widely and tenaciously held notions:
(1) that the whole is nothing more than the sum of its parts;
and (2) that what is good for a division or a departrjent must
inevitably be good for the company as a whole.*
As Sherwin* has indicated an organizational element has only dele-
gated rights to the information it does possess. The development of a
system for the gathering of the data essential for managers to carry out
their responsibilities is an arduous task, occurring over an extended
period of time for as, Ronald Daniel' has indicated, necessary information
does not flow naturally to the Job. This information has in time, become
tailored to its specific application and to the source inputs available.
Information sub-systems tend to perform quite adequately for their in-
tended purpose. The information gap develops, Daniel also points out,
when the organization structure is changed. New positions, responsibilities
and authority relationships can be decreed into effect; however such
facility is not usually experienced when attempting to modify an informa-
tion system that has grown, quite informally, over time. What is often not
recognized is the considerable ingenuity and genuine utility of these in-
formal gathering operations. Thompson states this point well in discussing
military information systems;
. . . the emphasis today on information systems built around
computers and communication equipment has obscured the great informa-
tional efficiencies obtained by ether means. This is particularly
true of military information-processing systems. The military comnand
hierarchy, with its already highly developed information traditions,
^Robert K. Gordon, Data Processing Today: A Progress Report .
A. K. A. Management Report No. 46, (New York: American Management Associ-






has provided means of reaching levels of information-processing
efficiency that are difficult to contemplate folly. rhese effici-
encies, embodied in organizations, should not be subject to
deprivation. And, although these traditions in themselves are no
longer adequate for solving the severe informational problems of
the military, they are an important part of its foundations and must
be understood, improved, and strengthened, not ignored and replaced. 2-
Daniel has cited the need for formal methods of communication,
particularly in large and changing organizations. He also emphasizes the
need for external information by an organization operating in a changing
environment. It is, however, the external information that is often the
most difficult to gather and report in a systemized, formal manner. Out-
side events, for example the events which produce sales, often elude
measurement until it is too late for their use in controlling.* •&& results
of these events, i.e., daily, weekly or monthly sales, are measurable but
often lack significance or worse yet may mislead, if not considered in rela-
tion to the available information concerning the event (s) vhich produced
them. Weekly narrative reports from company salesmen are time consuming to
prepare and digest and a strong inclination may exist to replace this seem-
ingly inefficient method of communication by more complete, more detailed
statistical reports of sales by product line, customer, territory, size,
color, price line and so forth. This greater emphasis on the results of
the events rather than on the less quantifiable causes of these events may
in actuality result in less control.
Frederick B. Thompson, "Design Fundamentals of Military Informa-
tion Systems," Military Information 'Systems: The resign of Computer Aided
Systems for Command ed. Edward !iennett„ James Degan and Joseph Gpiegal,
(?Iew York: Frederick A. Fraeger, Inc., 1964), p. 47.
2Feter F. trucker, "Controls, Control and Management," i-ianaaeaant
Controls; "ew Directions in Basic Research , ed. Charles P. Bonini,
Robert K. Jaedicke, and Harvey !!. Wegener, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1964), pp. 285-?94.
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Peter Trucker discusses the problem of measurements, and quanti-
fiable and non-quantifiable events in his uetcription of the four major
characteristics of control systems in business enterprises:^
1. Although the measurement of a physical event is objective
and numerical, the measure of a social event is subjective and biased. To
single out a social event to be controlled signals the importance of the
event and has the effect of both changing the event and the perception of
the observer. Thus controls in human organizations becone goal-setting
and value setting themselves by giving meaning and importance to the event.
Scrap losses, Trucker points out, in themselves are significant to the firm
only for their indirect effect on profits. Yet to single out scrap loss as
an item to be controlled establishes the attainment of a low scrap loss
as a ?oal for the responsible manager and a set of values upon which his
performance can be judged. Gverattenticn to the scrap situation obviously
can cause disproportionate expense in other less controlled areas.
2. In inost enterprises ninety per cent of the volume results from
two to five per cent of the items. Similarly, ninety per cent of the in-
curred costs result from less than ten per cent of the events. Management
therefore needs a system of controls which correctly identifies the real
structure of an event. Drucker states: "In fact . . . the constant drift
towards the irrelevant and unproductive is so great, and the weight behind it
so heavy, that a 'controls 1 system which did nothing but focus attention on
the central events — the events which under normal probability statistics
are not seen at all — would give any manager a great deal more control and
^DrucKer, "Controls, ..." op. cit ., pp. 285-2%.
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very much better performance and results than the most elaborate simula-
tion and quantification can possibly produce."1
3« Businesses are institutions of society and exist to contribute
to socisty. Consequently the results of enterprise, according to Srucker
exist only outside the business. It is the customer who creates a "profit;"
the events that occur within only create costs. Yet, Drucker observes,
managements have only limited ability to measure outside events and this
is the area in which information and control systems can make their greatest
contributions. Paradoxically , most of the data sensing and control effort
has been directed to internal events which are the easiest to measure and
control rather than to external events where the effort can be the most
productive.
Zi. "Business unlike all natural and mechanical systems exhibits
a wide range of events and results that are of profound importance and yet
cannot easily be quantified within any meaningful system of measurement.
But business, also, unlike any other social system has a wide range of
events and results which can be quantified. Business is the only system
we know which has both quantifiable and non-quantifiable results and
events, both equally important. "*
"This gives a unique opportunity for "control" and also a unique




3IM.d .. p. 2%.
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respect to the non-measurable elements involved misdirect and misinform."*
Drucker goes on to say that as more management information is
expressed quantitatively the greater will be the temptation to emphasize
these measures of performance and the greater the danger that what appears
to be "better control" will actually result in "less control" or the
business being "out of control."2
The necessity for adequate means of measure or appropriate standards
mu?t also apply to the information and control system itself. An undefined
notion that modification and integration of seemingly inefficient informa-
tion and control systems into a 3uperordinate-systeffi serving the entire
firm will produce better information and better control is insufficient
reason to disrupt a currently functioning system. That the whole is
greater than the sum of the parts must be proven specifically in each case.
More information is often erroneously equated with better information^ aore
control with better control.^ A realistic standard must therefore be estab-
lished to indicate the qualitative improvement that may be expected from any
contemplated revision of current data gathering and reporting techniques
and control procedures.
There are, of course, no universal set of factors that can be applied
to determine the effectiveness of a management information system. What
1IMd., p. 294.
2Ibid .
3s. A. Spencer, "The Dark at the Top of the Stairs: What Higher
Management Needs From Information Systems," Management Review . July 1962,
p. 6.
trucker, "Controls, . . ." op. cit ., p. 286.
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may be important to one organization may be relatively unimportant to
another. The specific factors in evaluating a specific system depend upon
the objectives of the organization, the strategies available for the achieve-
ment of these objectives and the rapidity with which these strategies will
change. Effectiveness measures are also important to determine a cost/
benefits ratio for any additional investment required to support the con-
templated change. It has been said: "The complexity of current infor-
mation systems is such that some of the design objectives cannot be expli-
citly stated; however, evaluation must be in terms of what can be stated
explicitly and decisions made only in terms of these objectives rather than
in terms of general inprovements expected in the system or the performance
of the organization served by it."
The Information and Control Spectrum
Evans and Hague State:
In order to work out a rational, integrated information system,
it is essential that information requirements of all levels of the
organization be considered. Those of the shop foreman, naturally, will
not be the same as those of the president. And the manager of manu-
facturing needs information that varies considerably from that used by
the productive worker at a machine . . .
Once information output requirements are determined, attention
should be concentrated on information input requirements. The objec-
tive here is twofold: (a) to keep information inputs to a minimum, and
(b) to devise ways of generating these inputs in elemental foms most
convenient for direct processing into as many of the required output
documents as possible. 2
*Ruth M. Davis, "Military Information Systems Design Techniques,"
Military Information Systems: The Desijgn of Computer Aided Systems for
Command ed. Kdward 3ennett, James Degan and Joseph Spiegel. (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), p. 20.
2Marshall K. Fvans and Lou R. Hague, "Master Plan for Information
Systems," Harvard Business Review . January-February, 1962, p. 95.
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Most writers on the subject of information and control point out
the variform information requirements of managers. Daniel states informa-
tion must be tailored to the hierarchical position and intended purpose of
the potential user. Koontsx stresses that what is meaningful to one manager
may not be to another. Jerome contends that control should provide man-
agers with the information to specifically plan and evaluate their own per-
formance. However, tailoring of information is not analogous to reworking
the same dnta by suasnarizing, condensing, consolidating, reporting in a
different foremat, converting from statistical to graphic presentation and
so on. Both Daniel and Sherwin have indicated that planning information
may be composed of the same data elements as control information but usually
is not.
A clearer image of the informational requirements and control
responsibilities of individual managers emerges from the three part
analysis of the managerial function put forth by Norman ReanK and more
recently that propounded by John Dearden.** The management task, according
to these authors, is embodied in these activities:
1. Strategic Planning , which consists of (a) determining
corporate policies and objectives; (b) deciding on any changes in
these policies and objectives and (c) deciding on the resources to






^Norman J. Ream, "The Need for Compact Management Intelligence,"
Management Control Systems, ed. Donald G. Malcolm and Alan J. Rowe (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., I960), pp. 82-9A.
**John Dearden, "Can Management Information Be Automated?" Harvard
Business Review. March-April, 1964, pp. 12S-135.
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2. Management Control , which consists of (a) dividing the
strategic plans into logical subdivisions; (b) providing the funds
to carry out the subdivisions of the plans; (c) assigning the
responsibility for carrying out each plan to some individual; (d)
following-up to see that the assignment is being satisfactorily
carried out.
3. Operational Control , which consists of (a) determining the
specific men, equipment, material and information necessary to
accomplish the subdivision of the plan; (b) assigning those resources
so that the plan can be carried out in the most efficient manner; and
(c) comparing actual result with plans and taking corrective action
when appropriate.^-
All levels of management may be concerned to some degree with all
of these activities. As Ream Points Out:
... we find that the responsibility for management planning
and management control increases as we approach the top echelons of
Management, and that operational control receives its greatest emphasis
at the . . . lowest management level. It is recognized, of course,
that planning and control responsibilities are inherent in every level
of management. The basic distinction lies in the emphasis en the
nature and degree of the planning and operational control responsi-
bilities found at each distinct level of management.2
For most purposes management control can be thought of as "super-
vising and evaluating operational personnel" and operational control as
"carrying out the day-to-day operations of the business. "^ Viewed in this
manner some essential difference in the types of data required for each of
these forms of control is readily seen. For example, notification that
the "on-hand" quantity of a particular item of stock has decreased to a
pre-established "low limit" or "tolerance threshold" may be quite necessary
1Ibid., pp. 129-130.
*Rean-, op. cit ., p. 90.
^Dearden, op. cit .. p. 130.
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in the exercise of operational control but would be of little importance
in management control, even leas in strategic planning. Although there
may be isolated requirements for stock level data elsewhere in the organ-
ization, i.e., in the sales and production departments possibly, to report
this information throughout the organisation makes no sense at all.
Similiarly, much of the long-range planning data would be of little value
in the solution of today's problems.
Charles Stein, Jr. speaks of the "spectrum of decision" occurring
in a management system:
I have heard many people say that there are really two parts
to a management system; (1) the routine tasks which do not involve
any decision making, and (2) the decisions involved in planning and
controlling operations. For our . . . purposes, however, it is more
useful to regard the entire process as a "spectrum of decision." At
the lower end of the spectrum are the simple, routine decisions ....
Toward the middle of the spectrum are the more complex but still
fundamentally "mechanical" decisions .... At the upper end of the
spectrum are the extremely complex managerial decisions .... As
we move up the spectrum more and more human judgement is injected
into the decisions J-
There exists also as Sherwin has affirmed a spectrum of information
and control, with seme being added or relinquished at each successive level.
Dauten, Gammill and Robinson2 visualize the "control reading" as an indica-
tion that action is required to correct a deviation in performance or to
adjust the established goals. But different forms of information are re-
quired for each task. Although information used for one level of decision-
making may be restructured and inputed to another decision level it is
important to note that not all information has such wide utility. Therefore
a body of information gathered by the sensors of inside and outside events
^Stein, op. cit .. pp. 82-83.
2
Supra , pp. 27-30.
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should flow through the system whereas other data should be transmitted
directly to the particular sub-system or decision level which can utilize
it. This is a fact not to be overlooked in systems design. Dearden has
observed a cannon mistake in many Management Information Systems in that
information is provided to one level that has been developed for use at
another. Inappropriately directed information is not only meaningless and
time wasting to the recipient but it tends to obscure the fact that many
decisions must be made without all the necessary information.
Control, as the tens is used by Jerome in slightly different con-
text, represents "patterns of activity followed by the skilled executive
in order to achieve some mastery over his environment.'^ The environment
of the goal-setter is often appreciably different from that of the con-
troller. There must be, as ??rach insists,* a complimentary relationship
between control and organisation, between flow of information and responsi-
bility. The importance of these relationships must not become obscured by
overemphasis of the holistic view of management and corresponding lesser
attention to its constituent parts.
Locus of Control
In the previous section emphasis was placed on the need for con-
sideration of the information requirements of the various managers in the
organisation. The problem of furnishing appropriate information, assuming
the data is available somewhere in the corporate entity, is a function of
^Dearden, op. clt ., p. 134.





the number of non-similar informational requirements which exist in the
organization. Implicit in most systems design objectives ie the notion of
efficiency through less departmentalization and fewer levels of management
and hence fewer specialised information requirements and fewer data element
inputs and outputs. More explicit expression of this supposition is con-
tained in the predictions of some observers that control of vast organisa-
tional complexes will, in the near future, be centralised in "management
cockpits" which are envisioned to be essentially computer equipped decision-
making rooms with elaborate display devices, including cathode ray and
light gun consoles. In these surroundings sales managers, controllers,
treasurers and production managers, rather than managing functional processes
from separate offices or divisions will operate as a team to analyze and
direct the integrated effort of the organization by application of the same
decision rules and watching the same scoreboard for total results.*-
Achievement of the "management cockpit" type of control envisions
the realisation of an over-all, fully integrated, or "total" management
system with complete monitoring of the enterprise by a computer or group
of interconnected computers and automated control of machines, inventories,
production, shipments, accounting, payrolls and all other operations that
can be represented mathematically. Direct human intervention would be
limited to "goal setting" and reaction to totally unexpected disturbances
brought on by wars, acts of Cod and so forth.
*James K. Swell, "The Total Systems Concept and How To Organise
For It," Computers and Automation . September 1961, p. 9«
2Herbert E. Klein, "Computer in the Boardroom," Dun's Review and
Modern Industry . September, 196i», p. 103.
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Herbert Klein, however, points out that experts in the field of
datamation do not agree on how close industry can come to a computer based
total system because of disagreement on the machine's ability to react to
man?" of the more comon but as yet unpredict situations. These indi-
viduals do agree, however that a system to provide top management "almost
up to the second information on every aspect of the integrated business
system" if feasible. Computers, in the opinion of many authorities, have
made recentralization of authority possible. One writer has stated:
"Probably the -iost dramatic effect of automation is reversal of the trend
to decentralization that became the fashion after Vforld War II with each
major division being operated almost like a separate company. Now companies
. . .
are using computers to allow more central decision-making and control.
John Deardon is among those who demurs on the feasibility of total
systems management by computer, at least for the foreseeable future. Al-
though decision rules can be programmed into operational control systeas,
Dearden does not see how this can be accomplished in management control
systems. Computers can make routine decisions but management decisions,
he states, are usually not routine and, given the present state of the art,
are not adaptable to automation. The type of instantaneous information
that could be obtained frGj^ the boardroom or "management Cockpit" computer
would be either historical data, which normally need not be produced on
short order, or operational control data. Operational control data, how-
ever are neither meaningful nor useful at a point so f^r removed from the
1Ibid




scene of operations. The danger inherent in this type of information
system, according to Dearden, is that with top management attempting to
control operations, either directiy or through the continuing harassment
of operating personnel, no one will be adequately performing the strategic
planning and management control of the organisation, k computer is not
required to communicate when something is seriously wrong in the operations
area, and this, he states, is the only time top management should be con-
cerned. Although top executives may need some data daily, such as sales
and production volume, the amount is not large and the usual procedure of
passing this information up from operating managers, who are also concerned,
can work quite satisfactorily.^* Eearden's view of the distinction between
management control and operational control is quite similar to Fayol's
separation of management control and technical control, Fayol as well
speaks of the potential danger of the infiltration of management control
into the operations of the various departments.*
The determination of the appropriate organisational location for
control is governed largely by the state of the art both in the generation
of suitable informational input, and in its utilisation and less by the
technology of the communication and manipulation of data. Elements to be
considered in the location of control centers in an organization are: the
inherent communication delays in information and control systems; the
problem of contextual adjustment in casnunlcationj and, the need for main-
taining organizational flexibility.




Inherent Communication Delays in Information
and Control Systems
Hecent advances in the design of data processing equipments have
resulted in phenomenal increases in the speed of access and manipulation
of data, Random access memory devices and optimal programming techniques
have reduced the transfer and computational time to a small fraction of
that required a few short years ago. Similar developments in the tele-
communication of data, both intra-plant and over thousands of miles have
also occurred. Information systems are often viewed in terras of data
processing; that is, Jacobs points out, as systems which transmit and manip-
ulate "numbers or quantitative indicators of qualities relevant to condi-
tions and action." Actually, Jacobs continues, "these systems are primarily
concerned with the transmission and processing of concepts."^-
Concepts are highly useful to those involved in the communication
process. This can be illustrated by consideration of the various concepts
which may be held concerning an item of production equipment, for example,
a drill press in a non-automated process shop. The drill press operator
is likely to view it as a machine which will drill holes to a pre-determined
depth in stesl and other materials at a rate of speed which is dependent
upon the hardness of the material to be processed, the sharpness of the
drill bit, and the revolutions per minute of the drill bit. To a mechanic,
*John F. Jacobs, "Communication in the Design of Military Informa-
tion Systems" Military Information Systems 8 The Design of Computer Aided
Systems for Command , ed. Ldward Bennett, James Degan and Joseph Spiegal,
(New vork: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), pp. 31-32.
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the drill press consists of a motor, drive belt, gear linkage and other
parts 3C313 of v;hich can be expected occasionally to require maintenance
.
To the nanager of the production department the drill press might represent
a sta,?e in the production process, and a piece of equipment to be manned
and for which work is to be scheduled. Each of these individuals, because
of time and interest limitations, tends to hold to only those concept
dimensions which are useful or necessary in his own job. Messages passing
through information and control systems involve the translation of concepts,
their co-ordination vith previously held concepts, the embedding of new
concepts, and the maintenance of previously held concepts to prevent dis-
tortion by newly translated and embedded concepts. Ibis is the principal
cause of cocrounication difficulties in information and control systems and
is one of the main reasons for time delays. To communicate, concepts must
be translated into a "common vocabulary" which, in turn, may require many
messages before true understanding is achieved. Communication delays are
often attributed to delays in handling of messages in the information
system, however, Jacobs maintains, ". . .in comparison to the delays in-
volved in the translation, embedding and maintenance of concepts, these
delays are so short that they are, in most instances, trivial."*
The greater the distance (organisationally and physically) between
the controller of an event and the impieraenter and sensor of that event, the
greater the conceptual difference that each will attach to the eventr
•Jacobs, op. cit ., pp. 32-33.
2Xold . t p. 34.
•^The truth of this statement is not altered by the use of an in-
animate sensor which forms no concept of the event which it senses.
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Returning to the previous example, if the production manager wishes
to control directly the operations performed by the drill prose operator,
he must possess a concept of the production process tnat is sufficiently
broad so as to include that which is held by the operator. Only in the
smallest of organisations would this be feasible because of the time
required to devote to the process of translation, embedding ami maintenance
of concepts.
Dauten, Gajaaill and Robinson shew graphically as has Forrester in
the book Industrial Dynamics the oscillations that can occur as a result
in delays in the implementation of control response. The element of time-
liness is also included in the preventative aspects of control && put
forth by Koontz, Allen ana Jerome. It is significant to note that many
of the writers on the subject of control, including Forrester, discuss
the problem of improving the timeliness of communication of data in terms
of speeding up the processing of data through, or circumvention of, the
intervening layers and interpretation points. The traditional approach
has been largely to consider that the disadvantage of delay in upward
reporting was partially offset by efficiencies achieved through the con-
solidation of data. For tho^e cases involving an operational control of
process in which speed of reaction to control information is of prime
importance, traditionalists advocate assignment of control responsibilities
to an individual close to the point of operations. It has only bsen with




the advent of the electronic computer and the capability to transmit
r^idly large quantities of data over great distances that the consider-
able distinction between the transmission of data and the communication
of concepts has begun to emerge. Shannon and Weaver1 categorize the
problems of communications as consisting of three levels:
Level A — The technical problem — How accurately can the symbols
of communication be transmitted?
Level B — The semantic problem — How precisely do the transmitted
symbols convey the desired meaning?
Level C — The effectiveness problem — How effectively does the
received meaning affect conduct in the desired way?
The technical problem has been largely solved; only slight progress
has been achieved at levels B and C. thus, the time delays resulting from
the problem of communicating concepts will remain for the foreseeable
future, a significant consideration in information and control system
design*
The Problem of Contextual Adjustment
in Communication
According to cyberneticians, it is through the communication of
information that a system is enabled to overcome the entropian tendency
toward lack of structure and inertness. Within any system, however, there
must exist a balance between the stability of the environment and the in-
ertias of the informational process.2 Thompson suggests that two ways in
Claude F. Shannon and Warren leaver, The Mathematical Theory of
Coreminlcfitlcr? (t'rbani-: The University of Illinois Fress, 1949,), p. 96.
"Thompson, op. clt .. p. 61.
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which stability in a system is accomplished are "specilization" which
Imposes contextual restraint limiting the area of concern, and "abstraction"
which limits the complexity of the context by grouping otherwise unrelated
aspects of context as a single object
.
Within low order sub-systems (or organizational sub-units) the
environment is highly specialized and characterized by confined interest.
Moving up the system structure the specialties are merged to an expanded
interest. The structure itself thus provides a means for overcoming the
informational inertia and achieving efficiency within an information system.
Specialization allows a sub-system to function with less informational
input, and abstraction permits use of lower density messages for the inte-
gration of sub-systems into larger systems. 2
Although it is theoretically possible to perform the contextual
adjustment centrally within the organization, there are, according to
Thompson, compelling reasons not to do so. "... the very essence of the
efficiencies that the coTamand hierarchy provides is its ability to hold
information orders of greater magnitude th^n can be maintained in a single
context. "3 This is evident when the "cryptic" messages of a football
huddle are considered. For example, if the quarterback announces "Play











implied in the dictionary meanings of the words. 1 This is analogous to
the situation occurring continuously in the business woriu whereby a one
sentence directive from the manager of production, for example , to order
a new item into production can set off a chain of events whereby the con-
text of this single message is expanded ana reexpanded by contextual ad-
justment into what may be hundreds of specific operational instructions
all of which are necessary to achieve directed action. Although the entire
set of detailed sub-instructions could be issued centrally rather than
progressively throughout the organization, to do so would cause both an
increase of message traffic in the information and control system and a
sharp drop-off in the amount of information flowing in the system. The
predicament is similar if control data is not adjusted contextually when
reported to higher organizational levels:
Imagine a situation in which a greater and greater amount of
the context of the lower level is transmitted upward. At [sitQ this
amount begins to approximate the total context of the lower level,
the communication processes themselves become an increasing portion
of this context. Thus there comes a point at which the transmission
of contextual aspects relevant to matters to the community becomes
less than the transmission of matter concerning the communications
themselves.*
To a degree the problem of information transfer without contextual
adjustment is technical, but in its larger aspect it is concerned with the
communication of relevancy. The denotation of the degree of importance
assigned to data is an item of information that may be as important to the
1Ibid., p. 65.
2Ibid .. pp. 64-65.
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recipient as the data elements themselves. Relevancy is also expressed
by the choice of what is communicated. Thompson states: "The choice of
facts communicated and the choice of facts aeked not only determine the
substantive content; they indicate what is thought to be revelant."1
The problem of contextual adjustment as it relates to the appro-
priate location for the exercise of control Involves the ability of the
information syster. to adapt the data to a form that it is meaningful to
the recipient and will elicit the required response. This is again not a
technical problem but rather it is related to the semantic and effectiveness
problem identified by Shannon and Weaver. Jerome has indicated that
control simplifies communications by providing a common language for
quantitative matters. This is of course true if the quantitative language
employed is meaningful to the recipient and its relevance to those matters
which are his responsibility is apparent. The problem of communicating
relevancy is related to the so called exception principle of reporting and
controlling which is identified by Koonta. If properly employed the ex-
ception technique 13 an effective means not only of reducing the overall
flow of data in the information and control system but of indicating the
relevancy of what is entered into the system. Ihis implies an initial
screening of the control data and the selection of those elements which
are relevant tc the next level of authority. In Figure 2-1, page 28
Tauten, Qammill and Robinson show a deviation of little significance at




The information and control system must, by contextual adjustment, indi-
cate what is and what is not important to the control center. It is only
when the information and control system provides this capability that the
control center can be effectively separated from the point of action. It
is in relation to the current limitations of many data handling systems,
particularly automated systems, to pre-select and properly identify signif-
icant information that has led Allen to conclude the "greatest potential
for control is in most cases, at the point of action."^-
The Need for Maintaining Organizational Flexibility
standards (or norms of performance) provide a common frame of
reference — they make the world more predictable. In this respect,
Bennett states, they facilitate "inter-and intrasystem information-
processing" and make communication and control more reliable. By the
integration of standards into an information system, a manager can control a
large number of sub-systems and by "symbolic manipulation," with or without
the use of electronic computers, can design the strategies to accomplish
his objectives. Standards, however, involve pre-detemined parameters and
thus impose constraints upon the range of actions a manager can take and
the number of alternatives he can consider, thereby reducing his flex-
ibility.*
^•Allen, on. cit ., p. 319.
2Edward Bennett, "Flexibility of Military Information Systems,"
Military Information Systems: The Design of Coaputer Aided Systems for
Command , ed. Edward Bennett. James Degan and Joseph Spiegal (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), pp. 97-98,

;In lower-order systems, Bennett goes on to say, problems tend to
be relatively well structured and the alternatives and the consequences
can be predicted reasonably well, hence inflexibility is less of a problem.
The operational drawbacks of a rigid and formalized system become most
apparent at the higher levels of the organization. Integrated aata pro-
cessing systems require standardized procedures for the selection, con-
solidating, processing and presentation of data. In implementing these
systems, some of the flexibility that was previously available to managers
at all levels is sacrificed. The decision to computerize certain processes
is not therefore exclusively a question of whether the computer can econ-
omically perform the task but also it is a question of whether it is
desirable to rigidly specify and standardize the informational process
involved.*
One of the chief advantages of the decentralization of control in
an organisation is that it allows the system to operate with a minimus^, of
horizontal integration and standardization. At any level, Bennett points
out, there may be various information processing activities; some are
concerned with the appropriate response to data about the external environ-
ment and others with inforsiation concerning the internal organization or
with special data about financial conditions, personnel, inventories, sales
and so forth. These information activities need not be highly related
since the amount of coordination that is required is determined by the
requirements of the next level upward in the organization. Individual




tion of foremat, language or reporting procedures since they all come
together at the next level upward and any subsequent reporting of this
information can be done in consolidated summary form.1
When viewed from the top downward, organizational policies, as
Clough2 indicates, serve as guidelines for the free and appropriate re-
sponse of subordinate controllers. Normally an individual at one level
will instruct those immediately below him concerning what they are to
accomplish by specification of the program objectives and it is for the
subordinates to then perform the job in the appropriate manner consistent
with the limits of regulations as set or interpreted by their superior.
This procedure is designed to insure that the implementing action of sub-
ordinate controllers is oriented to over-all policy objectives while at the
same time it permits maximum flexibility in the action to be taken at each
level of response .3
In contrast to this, a centralised control system "triggers" a
program by a single set of inputs from above. These inputs must specify
in detail, by a rigid set of specifications of allowable actions, all the
lower-order responses. Central control is therefore feasible only when:
(a) All the consequences of the controlled actions can be
foreseen and preplanned.
(b) Corrective action will occur in sufficient time to pre-
clude the occurrence of undesirable or unforeseen results.
(c) The system can readily adjust to new goals.
ilbld ., pp. 106-1C7.
2Sugra, p. 53.
3Ibid .. p. 104.
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For those events which cannot be subject to this type of control,
Bennett concludes the focus of control should be placed at the level which
will best permit the appropriate flexible response. He states: "In
general, the optimum amount of centralisation for any information system
appears to be the minimum required for passing upward data summaries of
actions taken at lower levels and data input inappropriate for action at
those levels. •"•
Beyond this, he finds centralisation tends to increase the data
loads at the higher levels of the organization and tends to restrict the
range of activities at lower levels, thereby decreasing the effectiveness
of an executive's control over his resources.
Lack of flexibility would be one of the "unsought consequences"
included in Koonts's second principle of control.* Bmch and Jerome also
discuss the need for flexible response by subordinates within a control
system.'
Thompson has indicated the dichotomy that often exists in the
design objectives for management information and control systems. Sy
providing adequate information to top management on the results achieved
by subordinate managers the information and control system is intended to
provide the means whereby the decentralisation of discretionary authority
is made practicable. Yet the imposition of rigid standards and procedures,
including uniform reporting techniques, may result in far less discretion-
ary authority at the lower levels.
1Ibid., p. 108.
nKoonts, "Management Control . . . ," op. clt .. p. 51.
Supra» PP« 26-36,

The flexibility of an enterprise is largely determined by its
plan of organization. If authority and control responsibility is con-
centrated at too few organizational levels, the adaptability of the
organization will be greatly curtailed. There is a direct relationship
between the location of control centers within the organization and the
ability of the organization to vary rapidly its response pattern to meet
unexpected challenges and opportunities.
,.umnary
This chapter has considered certain of the more significant design
considerations which have begun to emerge in recently published literature
concerning management information and control systems. These writings
indicate a recognition of certain limitations to the achievement cf totally
integrated systems which have cone into view in the attempts to implement
advanced technologies in data handling. Yet a review of the traditional
literature of management control indicates a similar awareness of these
problems
.
The objectives of integrated management information and control
systems are to provide to each executive in an organization data that is
in usable quantity and is appropriate to the responsibilities of his
position. The integrated system pre-supposes there will be a free-flow of
information through the artificial and arbitrary functional and sub-organ-
izational barriers existing in all large scale organizations so that all
data imputed in the organizational "memory" will be readily available to all
who require it. Integrated, computer based business systems and automated
production processes make possible the accumulation of by-product data
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concurrent with the on-going processes which have generated it. These
systems also permit the rapid combining, merging, consolidating and other-
wise manipulating of this data and its near instantaneous transmission to
any point in the organisation irrespective of the geographical distance in-
volved. This capability together with the availability of the management
scientist's decision aids — simulation, decision theory, game theory, etc.,
— has caused managements to reassess decentralisation policies and to view
the exercise of more direct control by top management as a means of
achieving improved integration of all activities of the enterprise. To a
large extent this appears to be at least an Implied goal in the design of
many of the management information and control systems currently being
installed.1
This objective, however, pre-supposes a level of communication
capability which has yet to be achieved in integrated data handling systems
— an ability to communicate concepts over extended organizational distance
efficiently, an ability to select effectively the relevant facts to be
transmitted to indicate this relevance in the cersmunication process, and
finally an ability to structure and appropriately report this data through-
out the organization. To the extent that decision-making authority can be
delegated to the machine these become technical problems and matters of
decisional delay and overload at the decision centers are of less concern
than in a man-machine system. However, as Forrester indicates, mathematical
techniques have not yet reached a level that permits solution by formula of
^Dearden, op. cit .. p. 128.
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the ill-structured, multivariable problems which are the substance of most
managerial control decisions. •*
In the process of designing* systems with a greater degree of
closed-loop control there is developing a realization that rsoaa of the
previously utilised non-integrated functionally oriented management infor-
mation and control systems which reflect the traditional concepts of informa-
tion reporting and control have utility and purpose and a level of efficiency
which is "difficult to contemplate fully."2 These traditional systems
often relied heavily on interpretative reporting of events and their prob-
able causes rather than on a quantitative measure of the external mani-
festation of these events. This form of intelligence gathering, while ill-
suited to many of the highly structured operational control problems of
organizations, remains superior to statistical measure for many of the
planning and management control responsibilities. Excellent progress to
date has been made in the generation and reporting of operational by-
product data. However, this data is not interchangeable with interpreta-
tive reporting of events and their causes. For these reasons management
information and control systems planning should provide for an explicit
measure of expected performance. Unclear assertions of potential improve-
ments in speed, accuracy, completeness and appropriate no e.v of reporting
and control activities are insufficient to adjudge integrated data handling
procedures to be superior to those currently in u*e.
Lyndall Urwick first suggested the use of control data in the plan-




^Urwick, The 1- 1 omenta . . . , op. cit .. p. 102,
^Thompson, op. cit . t p. A7
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control have also emphasized the use o£ control data as a oasis for fore-
casting and planning as well as for preventing and correcting deviations
and errors. To a degree the management theorists who have stressed the
action phase of raanageniant control have also recognized a close relation-
ship between control and the other executive functions. Ihe presence of
control, according to Jerome,* creates an environment in which efforts of
all the members in an organization are directed to the effective accomplish-
ment of the goals and objectives. Dauten, Ganmill ana Aobinsoirvisualise
the exercise of control as leading to either the correction of deviations
from plans or to replanning and subsequent implementation of newly formed
or modified plans.
In some respects this view of control is not wholly unrelated to
I'ary "arker Follette*s^ concept of control through coordination in that
the results rather than the methodology of control are stressed. Unlike
Follette however, both Dauten and Jerome recognize reporting as the basis
for control.
It has been, however, the "Inforaationists" who have perceived
the great contrast in the types of information suitable for planning
purposes as opposed to the data appropriate to the preventative or cor-
rective actions of managers who are responsible for insuring that on-going









"control spectrum" to emphasize the differing informational requirements
of various organisational levels and purposes. Emch-^and Daniel* stress
the importance of relating information flow to organisational assignment
and judging the adequacy of information by appropriateness of its content
and quantity in relation to the planning and control responsibilities of
those who will receive it.
There is strong evidence in his writing that Fayol recognized
the clear distinctions in the types of information required for planning,
management control and technical control of operations. A number of
subsequent writers on the subject of management control lost sight of
these distinctions. However more recent contributors ~ e.g., Sherwin,
Daniel and others — through emphasis on the informational aspects of
control have shown a return to Fayol 1 s view. This reemphasis of the
distinct informational requirements for planning, managerial control and
for operational control has developed largely as a result of the research
of management scientists who have provided a better understanding of the
nature of information and of feedback control in systems and organizations
as well as a more precise vocabulary to describe this aspect of management.
There is a basic unity of purpose in the efforts of the traditional
and the management science schools. Also there are complimentary aspects
in the contributions both have made in the field of management. It has





the significant contributions of both schools can ultimately merge into a
unified body of management theory.
The need for a generally accepted theoretical base for the manage-
ment process has been often stressed. Fayol accredited the lack of manage-
ment teaching in the technical schools to the need for a theory of manage-
2
nent since, as he said, "without theory no teaching is possible." Chester
Barnard also decried the lack of "an acceptable conceptual scheme" by which
executives could exchange ideas concerning their work.-* Efforts to achieve
a unified theory of management, or of any significant aspect of the manage-
ment process, have been notably unsuccessful. Urwick's attempt to consoli-
date several of the early contributions in the field of management into a
•ingle "logical scheme" failed for the reasons citea earlier in this paper.
Nor is there any evidence that the several attempts of Harold Koontz to
build a unified theory based on management principles were any more fruit-
ful.^ Koontz attributes th© difficulties in achieving a generally acceptable
theory of management to a lack of a standard terminology and clear defini-
tion of management as well as a tendency of modern writers to discredit the
.-Coontz, Toward a
. . . , or. cit ., p. 15.
2




^Harold Koontz, ;'A Preliminary Statement of Principles of Planning
and Control," Current Issues and Emerging Concepts in Management? Readings
for the Academy of Management , ed. r&ul '.-.. tauten, Jr. (Boston: Houghton
riflir Company, 1962), vp. 116-13 5
.
Kocntz, "V-r it Control
. .
.," op. cit ., p. 56.
Koontz, Toward . . . , op. cit ., p. 11.
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contributions of others while offering, instead, what they believe are
distinct and original approaches to management theory with which they will
become identified.-*-
The problem involved is that any general theory of management must
be stated in terms of generalizations because the number of variables in
management situations and their complex interrelationships are not only
difficult to perceive but defy mathematical or logical analysis and are
thus incapable of proof. This is true whether the theory is based on
the empirical observations and experience of the management traditionalist
or the experimentation of the management scientist. that generalizations
cannot be proved, however, does not negate their usefulness, Beveridge
explainst
They [generalisations] can be tested by seeing whether deductions
made from them are in accord with experimental and observational
facts, and if the results are not as predicted, the hypothesis or
generalisation may be disproved . But a favorable result does not
prove the generalisation, because the deductions made from it may be
true without its being true .... In strict logic a generalisation
is never proved and remains on probation indefinitely, but if it
survives all attempts at disproof, it is accepted in practice,
especially if it fits into a wider theoretical scheme.
3
So long as management generalisations remain unprovable, new con-
cepts of management and of the organisation in which the management process
occurs will continue to have their detractors, whether these concepts are
based on observation and experience or are developed by analogy or Simula*
XIbid., pp. 1-17.
nforrester, op. cit .. p. 18.
hi. I. B. Beveridge, The Art of Scientific Investigation (The
Modern Library; New York: Random House, 1957), p. 118.
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tion or other experimental means. Therefore a unified or generally ac-
cepted theory of management control is not likely to evolve, at least in
the foreseeable future.
The distance currently separating the traditional and management
science schools is perhaps characterized by these comments:
Herbert Simon (in a discussion of the value of the traditional
approach to management theory): "What you are saying about Fayol
is that I ought to believe Fayol because he ran some coal mines,
or whatever it was that he ran, very well. I see no reason to
conclude fror. this that he is a man who can state propositions of
organization theory that will stand up under the tests of evidence."^
Peter Drucker (in a paper dealing with the contributions of man-
agement science in the design of information and control systems):
"What is needed ... in the people who design controls is an
ability different from that of the physical scientist and instru-
sent maker."*
Koontz, Toward . . . . op. cit .. p. 110.




The research undertaken In the preparation of this paper has led
this writer to the conclusion that traditional concepts of management
control provide a useful body of knowledge which should be considered
in conjunction with the contribution of management science in the design
of management information and control systems.
The considerable utility of traditional management thought is not
always fully evident, however. One reason is that the contributions of
academicians and practitioners of management exhibit considerable disarray
— a condition particularly notable in the case of management control theory.
Control was first identified as an essential element of the manage-
ment process by Henri Fayol, a French industrialist who devoted the latter
years of his life to publishing a theory of management which he developed
both from his personal observation and long experience. Fayol' s theory
of management was first published in France in 1916, under the title of
Administration lndustrielle et generale ; it was subsequently translated
and published in English in 1929 and 1949. Management control, according
to Fayol, involved insuring that events occur in conformance with plans by
examining results, pointing out weaknesses and errors, rectifying them and




by the top management of an organization with control exercised within the
subordinate functional spheres of responsibility and spoke of the potential
danger of management control infiltrating into the operations of the various
departments.
Confusion concerning the exact meaning of management control has
existed since the first translation of Fayol 's work into English and con-
tinues to some degree, to the present time. Contributing causes includes
1. Failure of Fayol to complete °art III of his work, in which
he planned to include an expanded explanation of his elements of management,
including illustrative examples.
2. Inexactness in the translation of Fayol' s work, which resulted
in the use of the emotionally charged word "control" for his sixth element
of management rather than a word bearing the connotation of checking,
verifying or comparing which would be more appropriate to his intended
meaning,
3. An early attempt by Lyndall Urwick to fit a number of indepen-
dently developed and somewhat unrelated management concepts into a single
"logical scheme" of management principles, processes and effects which
produced an association of his idea that command results in control with
Fayol ! s checking-up or surveillance aspect of management and Follette ! s
concept of effecting control through coordination rather than coercion,
Goodwin finds Coubourgh, the first translator of Fayol' s work, as
primarily responsible for the confusion surrounding management control but
Urwick must share in the blame as his book The Elements of Administration
preceded the more widely distributed second translation of Fayol* s work
and had the effect of pre-conditioning readers to an erroneous interpretation.
.•
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Since that time control has taken on many meanings in connection
with management — fro.-n a very broad interpretation so as to become almost
synonymous with "management" to restricted meanings such as "quality-
control" and "production control." Not only was Fayol's distinction
between management control and technical control lost, but control came to
include all intelligence gathering processes including the assembly of in-
formation for forecasting and planning as well as for the prevention of
deviations and the correction of errors. More recent literature reflecting
the traditional approaches to management control, however, has stressed the
informational aspects of control — claiming that information furnished to
each executive in an organization must be appropriate to his specific re-
sponsibilities and that there are significant differences in the types of
information suitable for strategic planning, for management control and for
operational control. Although persons associated with the traditional
school of management thought have, for the most part, avoided explicit
recordation of the contributions of the management science school, the
timing of their reer.phasis of the relation of information and control would
indicate the theory of control in organizations developed by the management
scientists has had notable influence on traditional management thought.
The renewed stress on the distinct information requirements and
executive responsibility associated with operational control, management
control and strategic planning represents a return to the Fayolian concept.
But, as is true of any worthwhile theory, management theory has been subject
to continuing forces of change. Paradoxically, the formulation of a theory
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of Information-feedback control In human organisations which has led to a
greater recognition by the traditionalists of the differentiation in
informational requirements has led others to a ''holistic 1' view of organ-
isations, stressing the essential unity of informational requirements,
responsibilities and objectives rather than differentiation. That two
seemingly conflicting conclusions could be reached from examination of
the nature and utilisation of information within a humanly constituted
organisation is not necessarily indicative of erroneous reasoning by either
group. Rather, it is indicative of the degree of acceptance of information-
feedback control as an adequate explanation of the management process.
Information-Feedback Control Theory conceptualizes the management
process as primarily effected through the flow of Information in the or-
ganisational system and its constituent sub-systems. Objectives, expressed
as a "desired state" for the system and sub-systems, are established by
the goal-setter and communicated to the controller who is responsible, on
the basis of information gathered by "sensors" and passed to him by "informa-
tion processors ,! for correcting deviations from the desired state through
feedback of directive information to the point of operations, in much the
same manner as a thermostat controls a furnace or a servo-mechanism controls
a machine. Unlike a thermostat which only senses data within an enclosed
space, organizational sensors gather both internal information and external
information related to the disturbing influences affecting the systems and
sub-systems to be used, when necessary, for adjusting goals to more attain-
able levels. There will, however, always be delays and amplification in
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an information-feedback control system resulting in oscillations between
the actual and desired state of the system of an amplitude and length
determined by the characteristics of the feedback loop. The search for
means of overcoming this deficiency in organisational systems has led the
management scientist to investigate the structure of organizations and
the decision processes which occur within them and to simulate with mathe-
matical models to determine improved organizational design.
Strategic planning, including the integration of the sub-systems,
is effected by utilisation of information flowing freely and rapidly
throughout the organization, a feat considered technically feasible with
the electronic data processing and data communications equipment currently
available. This capability together with the new decision-aids developed
by the management scientists has caused managements to consider recentral-
ization as a weans of reducing the effects on over-all performance caused
by deviations from plan (oscillations) within organizational sub-units and
to place greater reliance on quantitative measures of events rather than
on qualitative expressions or subjective analysis of these events. In
addition integrated computer based management information and control
systems are being designed to replace functionally oriented systems.
The achievement of these objectives, however, requires a level of
communication capability yet to be achieved in integrated automated data
handling systems. Specifically these would include the ability to (a)
efficiently communicate concepts over extended organizational distances,
(b) effectively measure the causes of events, to select relevant facts and

1 .1
to indicate this relevance in the communication process end to provide
information that is appropriate in type, quantity and foreraat to each
responsible manager within an organization and (c) maintain flexibility
in a centrally activated information and control system.
There is ample evidence in the traditional literature of manage-
ment control of a recognition of these problems in the exercise of control
within organizations as well as the fact that a trade-off exists in the
exchange of functionally oriented control for integrated control. This
admonitory advice concerning control, it must be acknowledged, is often
obscured in inpreciseness of terminology and clouded by vague generalities
and contradictions which have caused its depredation by those oriented to
scientific endeavor. Management science however, has provided both a frame
of reference, in Information-Feedback Control Theory, and a terminology
that has been a stimulus for the interjection of order in the disarray of
traditional management control theory.
Traditional management theory can make a significant contribution
to management science and to systems design by distinguishing well founded
analogies from the superficial siailiarities of other systems, and by
identifying interacting variables and parameters in simulation models of
management processes. It can further contribute by diverting attention
away from the highly attractive technological achievements in data handling
to the more important problems of management information needs and control
responsibilities and toward an emphasis on "better" information rather than
"more" information, better "control" rather than "more" control.

_;2
There is a basic unity of purpose in the efforts of the traditional
and management science schools as well as a complimentary relationship in
their contributions and it has been predicted that these and other schools
of management thought will ultimately merge. Although the lack of a unified
theory of management has long bee 1 decri?d, efforts to achieve a unified
theory of management or any significant aspect of management have been
notedly unsuccessful. Any widely applicable theory of management, regard-
less of its source, must be stated in terms of generalizations and is,
therefore, incapable of proof. Such a theory would probably fail to gain
wide acceptance. Trssis and antithesis rather than synthesis appears the
prospect for rsanageraent theory in the foreseeable future.
The existence of two theoretical bases of management thought is not
necessarily an undesirable condition. Through feedback, autuiil enrichment
and reinforcement both can continue to grow. As terminology becomes more
uniform and recognition of the contributions and accomplishments of each
develops, rapport between the divergent groups should improve and manage-
ment as an art and management as a science should continue to grow, al-
though on separate and non-convergent paths. Management as an art is based
on generalisations developed from observation and experience. Management
as a science generalises from analogy and experimentation. Both h^ve their
place in modern management thought; both can contribute to an understanding
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